Behavioral Economics and Physician Behavior by Ward, Allyssa S.
Bucknell University
Bucknell Digital Commons
Honors Theses Student Theses
Spring 2012
Behavioral Economics and Physician Behavior
Allyssa S. Ward
Bucknell University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/honors_theses
Part of the Health Economics Commons, and the Mathematics Commons
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses at Bucknell Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Bucknell Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcadmin@bucknell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ward, Allyssa S., "Behavioral Economics and Physician Behavior" (2012). Honors Theses. 117.
https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/honors_theses/117


ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: 
 
I would like to thank Professor Amy Wolaver for her devotion to this project.  This study 
would not have been possible without her direction. 
 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 
 
Title Page   …........................................................................... i 
Acknowledgments  …........................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents  …........................................................................... iii 
List of Figures  …........................................................................... v 
Abstract   …........................................................................... vii 
I. Introduction   …........................................................................... 1 
II. Literature Review  …........................................................................... 2 
  II.A. Background on Health Care Variations across the United States …......... 2 
  II.B. The Availability Heuristic and Its Relevance to Health Care Spending … 8 
III. Theory   …........................................................................... 16 
IV. Outcomes of Interest  …...........................................................................  18 
V. Data   …........................................................................... 20 
  V.A. Childbirth  …........................................................................... 21 
  V.B. Appendicitis   …........................................................................... 26 
VI. Methods   …........................................................................... 31 
VII. Results   …........................................................................... 33 
  VII.A. Childbirth  …........................................................................... 33 
  VII.B. Appendicitis   …........................................................................... 37 
VIII. Limitations  …........................................................................... 42 
IX. Conclusions  …........................................................................... 44 
iv 
 
Appendices   …........................................................................... 48 
  Appendix A: Map of Hospital Regions …..................................................... 48 
  Appendix B: ICD-9 Codes Used in Variable Definitions  ….............................. 48 
  Appendix C: Tables of Definitions and Summary Statistics …................... 49 
  Appendix D:  Regression Results ….................................................................. 60 
  
v 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Graph of Demand-Shifting  ….................................................. 6 
Figure 2: Efficiency Loss Due to Availability …...................................... 17 
Figure 3: Summary Statistics of Childbirth Variables at the Physician Level .. 24 
Figure 4: Summary Statistics of Appendicitis Variables at the Physician Level. 29 
Figure 5: OLS Regression Results for Physician's “Unnecessary” Cesarean 
 Rate as Predicted by Previous Bad Outcomes and Previous “Unnecessary” 
 Cesarean Rate  …....................................................….......................... 34 
Figure 6: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Physician's “Unnecessary”  
 Cesarean Rate as Predicted by Previous Bad Outcomes …............... 35 
Figure 7: Logistic Regression Results for Patient's Probability of Having a 
 C-Section Based on Physician's “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate and Patient 
 Insurance Status …..........................................................…........….... 36 
Figure 8: OLS Regression Results for Physician's Rate NA as Predicted 
 by Previous Bad Outcomes and Total Hospital Discharges .................. 38 
Figure 9: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Physician's Rate NA 
 as Predicted by Previous Bad Outcomes …...................................... 40 
Figure 10: Logistic Regression Results for Patient's Probability of Having  
 a Negative Appendectomy based on Physician's Rate NA and Patient Insurance 
 Status ….............................................................................…................ 41 
 
vi 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This study seeks to answer whether the availability heuristic leads physicians to 
utilize more medical care than is economically efficient. Do rare, salient events alter 
physicians' perceptions about the probability of patient harm?  Do these events lead 
physicians to overutilize certain medical procedures?  This study uses Pennsylvania 
inpatient hospital admissions data from 2009 aggregated at the physician level to 
investigate these questions.  The data come from the 2009 Pennsylvania Health Care Cost 
Containment Council (PHC4).   
 The study is divided into two parts.  In Part I, we examine whether bad outcomes 
during childbirth (defined as maternal mortality, an obstetric fistula or a uterine rupture) 
lead physicians to utilize more cesarean sections on future patients.  In Part II, we 
examine whether bad outcomes associated with appendicitis (defined as patient death, a 
perforated or ruptured appendix or sepsis) lead physicians to perform more negative 
appendectomies (appendectomies performed when the patient did not have appendicitis) 
on future patients.   
 Overall the study does not find evidence to support the claim that the availability 
heuristic leads physicians to overutilize medical care on future patients.  However, the 
study does find evidence that variations in health care utilization are strongly correlated 
with individual physician practice patterns.  The results of the study also imply that 
physicians' financial incentives may be a source of variation in health care utilization. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2009, health care spending in the United States accounted for $8,086 per 
person or 17.6% of gross domestic product (GDP).  Over half of these expenditures were 
attributed to physician-directed care (physician/clinical services: 21% and hospital care: 
31%).  From 2010 to 2020, health care spending is predicted to grow faster than GDP on 
average, and by 2020, health care spending is expected to account for 19.8% of GDP 
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services).  The health care industry makes up an 
increasingly crucial part of the United States' economy, and evidence shows that this 
important industry is not always efficient.  As documented later in this paper, there are 
substantial variations in health care utilization trends across the country, and higher 
utilization is not correlated with better quality of care.  Understanding physician behavior 
can therefore help economists understand why these variations in utilization exist and can 
help economists determine how to increase efficiency in the health care market. 
 This study uses concepts from behavioral economics to test whether physicians' 
personal experiences lead to excessive spending.  Specifically, we examine the 
availability heuristic – the idea the salient or common memories can skew physicians' 
perceptions of probabilistic events.  While experimental evidence has suggested that the 
availability heuristic impacts physician behavior, this observational study assesses 
whether the availability heuristic has a substantial impact on variations in care across the 
nation.   
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 We hypothesize that negative outcomes during childbirth and appendicitis 
encourage physicians to perform more unnecessary cesarean sections or appendectomies, 
respectively, than are necessary.  We will begin by reviewing some background 
information on variations in health care spending across the United States.  We will then 
review some literature on the availability heuristic and its applications in health care 
markets.  Next, we will explain the economic theory surrounding our hypotheses.  We 
will then describe our data and methods.  Finally, we will discuss the results of the study 
as well as its limitations and draw some conclusions about the availability heuristic and 
its relevance to health care spending. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
II. A. Background on Health Care Variations across the United States 
 
 When considering health care spending, we must focus our attention on physician 
behavior.  Physicians play a crucial role in determining health care costs because of 
asymmetric information.  Asymmetric information refers to transactions involving two 
parties in which one party knows more than the other.  When it comes to health care, 
patients know very little about different diagnoses and treatment options.  Physicians, on 
the other hand, are experts when it comes to medical practice.  This imbalance of 
knowledge is why patients allow physicians to act as their “agents.”  In other words, 
when patients are in need of medical care, they ask physicians to make decisions on their 
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behalves and trust that the physicians will act in their best interest (Folland et al. 2010, 
197).   Therefore, physicians have significant control over medical decisions and, 
consequently, health care costs.   
 Many economists have attributed excessive health care spending to unnecessary 
variations in physician practices.  For instance, Fisher et al. (2003) performed a two-part 
study on regional variations in Medicare spending in the last six months of a patient's life.   
They grouped the data into hospital referral regions (HRR).  For each HRR, they 
calculated an End-of-Life Expenditure Index (EOL-EI).  The EOL-EI measures 
differences in Medicare spending that result from physician practices rather than 
underlying patient illness or relative prices.  They studied four different cohorts: patients 
with acute myocardial infarction (MI), hip fracture, and colorectal cancer, which are all 
diseases with similar hospitalization rates across the country.  They also studied the 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) sample.  Within each cohort, they broke 
the data into five quintiles based on values of the EOL-EI, and used multivariate 
regression to analyze differences among quintiles.  They found that regions in the highest 
quintile received 61% more Medicare resources than regions in the lowest quintile, and 
that most of the variation was due to evaluation and management services, tests, 
radiology, and minor procedures.  Additionally, regions in the highest quintile were more 
likely to utilize specialists as opposed to general practitioners. 
 In the second part of the study, they examined differences in quality of care 
among the EOL-EI quintiles.  They looked at three different measures of quality of care: 
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the one-year predicted chance of mortality, changes in functional status according to the 
Health Activities and Limitations Index (HALex), and satisfaction of care as indicated by 
a twenty-question survey on the MCBS.   They showed that higher utilization did not 
correlate with higher quality of care.  They found that the highest EOL-EI quintile 
actually had a statistically significantly higher predicted chance of mortality than the 
lowest quintile.  Additionally, they found no statistically significant differences in 
changes in functional status and no consistent, significant differences in satisfaction of 
care.  To summarize, certain regions of the country spend significantly more on health 
care than others without attaining better results.  This implies that certain regions can 
lower health care spending without lowering quality of care. 
 In a more recent study, Fisher et al. (2004) studied variations in intensity of care 
(per patient spending) in academic medical centers (AMC) across the United States for 
chronically ill Medicare patients.  They also divided the AMCs into five groups based on 
their intensity of care.  After verifying that the initial patient health was relatively 
uniform across all five groups, Fisher et al. looked at differences in health care spending 
across the five groups.  They found that per patient spending varied by between 47% to 
58% six months after the initial hospitalizations.  Most of this variation was due to 
“supply-sensitive” procedures such as diagnostic tests and imaging and management 
services rather than surgical procedures.  They also found that after the first six months, 
inpatient use was between 61% and 84% higher for patients in the highest intensity group 
as compared to the lowest intensity group.  Finally, Fisher et al. showed that intensity was 
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not related to survival or quality of care (as measured by the Cooperative Cardiovascular 
Project).  In fact, in some cases, higher intensity was actually associated with lower 
survival!  Fisher's work provides evidence that variation in health care spending and 
utilization across the United States is indeed extensive and unwarranted. 
 Similarly, the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare in Pennsylvania (Bronner et al. 
1998) documents significant variations in the use of acute care hospital resources across 
small areas in Pennsylvania.  For instance, utilization trends for elective surgeries are 
idiosyncratic and vary by individual physicians.  Bronner et al. call these idiosyncrasies 
the “surgical signature.”  The atlas also documents large variations in the treatment of 
diseases for which there are no well-defined standards of care.  For instance, rates of 
coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG) varied by a factor of five across regions and  
rates of cesarean sections (c-sections) varied by a factor of almost four.  Again, this study 
provides evidence that utilization is not linked to patient outcomes.   
 Bronner et al. also argue that utilization trends are more heavily influenced by the 
supply of resources available than by the overall illness of the population.  Simple linear 
regression showed a positive correlation between the per capita number of hospital beds 
and discharge rates for medical conditions with an R-squared value of 0.53.  Bronner et 
al. claim that “geography is destiny” – that patients' treatments are determined by the 
supply of resources and type of physicians in the area rather than their illnesses. 
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 Bronner et al. are not the first to provide evidence of a correlation between the 
supply of services and the amount of health care provided.  Some health economists 
believe that physicians alter the demand for health care.  In other words, physicians can 
increase the quantity of care provided without lowering prices, increasing total overall 
costs in the economy.  Figure 1 illustrates the concept of demand-shifting or supplier-
induced demand. 
 
 Victor R. Fuchs (1978) provided evidence of “demand-shifting” in his study of in-
hospital operations across the United States.  He hypothesized that an increase in the 
number of surgeons in an area would increase the number of surgeries performed in the 
area.  His reasoning was that in areas where supply is higher, physicians have to induce 
demand in order to achieve or maintain a certain level of income.  Fuchs looked at 
utilization data from the Health Interview Survey from 1963 and 1970 in conjunction 
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with physician supply data from the AMA.  Using multivariate regression analysis, Fuchs 
concluded that physicians do in fact shift demand.  In fact, each additional surgeon in a 
particular area was associated with an increase of between 40 to 60 operations each year.   
 Fuchs also acknowledged that areas with high demand for surgeons might attract 
more supply.  To address this issue, Fuchs predicted the number of surgeons attracted to a 
particular region based on socioeconomic traits and the potential demand within the 
region.  He found that potential demand had little influence on surgeons' choice of 
location.  Then, using the predicted supply variable in place of actual supply, he once 
again found evidence of demand-shifting.  In the end, he concluded that a 10% increase 
in the surgeon/population ratio led to a 3% increase in the number of operations in that 
region, along with an increase in price.    
 Another study on “demand shifting” or “supplier induced demand” looked at 
patients admitted to the hospital for childbirth from 1970-1982 according to the National 
Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) (Gruber et al. 1996).  During that period, fertility fell 
by 13.5% in the United States, but the rate of cesarean sections (c-sections) rose by 
240%.  According to Gruber et al., c-sections require less effort on the part of the 
physician and reimbursements for c-sections are generally higher than for vaginal 
deliveries.  Gruber et al. therefore hypothesized that a decrease in the fertility rate would 
lead physicians to utilize more c-sections in order to maintain their income.  Using 
multivariate regression analysis and controlling for patient demographics, hospital size 
and region, and complications during birth that would make a c-section more likely, 
8 
 
Gruber et al. found that there was indeed a statistically significant negative correlation 
between the rate of fertility and the rate of c-sections used from 1970-1982.  A 10% 
decline in fertility was associated with a 0.97 percentage point increase in the rate of c-
sections.   
 The findings of Fisher et al. (2003, 2004), Bronner et al. (1998), Fuchs (1978), 
and Gruber et al. (1996) indicate that there is indeed unwarranted variation in physician 
practices.  Fuchs (1978) and Gruber et al. (1996) suggest that this variation may be driven 
by physicians' financial incentives.  However, cognitive biases, specifically the 
availability heuristic, may be another source of variation.  In order to fully understand the 
healthcare market, we must reject some of the premises of neoclassical economics and 
borrow some knowledge from behavioral economics.  If physicians are indeed subject to 
the availability heuristic, then perhaps policymakers can enact policies or measures to 
decrease the use of inappropriate care. 
 
II.B. The Availability Heuristic and Its Relevance to Health Care Spending 
 
 The basic model of economic behavior is grounded in the assumption that human 
beings are rational economic agents that make informed decisions based on marginal 
costs and marginal benefits.  However, empirical evidence of human behavior does not 
always support this assumption.  In their most recent book, Nudge, behavioral economist 
Richard H. Thaler and his colleague Cass R. Sunstein explain that, in fact, human beings 
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are not always rational and do not always make the best decisions.  Instead, real humans 
often struggle with complicated decisions and make systematically biased projections.  
By accepting that homo sapiens are not perfect economic beings (homo economicus), 
behavioral economists can better understand the decisions that humans make.   
 Although patients would like to believe that their doctors are infallible, physicians 
are in fact human.  Like all humans, medical doctors are subject to systematic biases that 
cause a disconnect between their own perceptions and reality.  In particular, physicians 
might make biased decisions that result from the use of heuristics, or “rules of thumb” 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 17-39).   
 Tversky and Kahneman (1974) completed the most important work regarding 
heuristics.  They identified three heuristics (representativeness, anchoring and 
adjustment, and availability), but for the purpose of this study, we will focus our attention 
on one – the availability heuristic.  Availability occurs when we mistakenly judge 
probabilities based on examples that are salient and easily retrievable. For example, in 
one of Tversky and Khaneman's experiments, participants were asked to consider all the 
words in the English language.  They were asked to guess whether more words began 
with the letter “r” or whether “r” more frequently appeared as the third letter of a word.  
Most people incorrectly chose the former because they could easily think of words that 
started with “r.”  In this experiment, availability led subjects to form incorrect judgments. 
 Salient events can also spark the availability heuristic.  For instance, when 
assessing a patient's risk for suicide, a doctor might consider previous patients' 
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experiences.  The doctor may weigh the experiences of patients who committed suicide 
more heavily than those who were depressed but did not commit suicide because suicide 
is a salient event (Tversky and Kahneman 1973).   Another example is that in the months 
after 9/11, Americans cut their air travel by 20%.  Many Americans began driving more 
in place of flying because the memory of 9/11 caused them to overestimate the 
probability of a plane crash.  In reality, Americans are approximately 37 times more 
likely to die in an automobile accident than in a plane accident.  In fact, some statisticians 
estimate that the number of highway deaths due to increased vehicle travel after 9/11 far 
outweighed the number of people who died on a plane during the 9/11 attacks (Myers 
2003).  It is this application of the availability heuristic – the relationship between 
availability and salience – that we examine in this study.    
 Availability is not always a hindrance to effective decision-making.  In fact, more 
often than not, availability likely serves as a useful tool in health care because it allows 
physicians to diagnose common or severe diseases more quickly.  However, if physicians 
rely too heavily upon availability, there can be negative consequences for both the 
patient's health and health care spending.    
 Doctors themselves admit to falling victim to cognitive biases.  In his book How 
Doctors Think, Jerome Groopman, M.D. (2007) describes some biases and pitfalls that he 
and his colleagues faced when making medical decisions.  His own examples and 
commentary imply that the availability heuristic influences physician behavior.   
 One example involves Harrison Alter, M.D..  Alter was working in the emergency 
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department in Tuba City, AZ when he met a Navajo woman who complained that she was 
having trouble breathing.  The woman was running a low fever, and she told Alter that 
she had taken a few aspirin to deal with her symptoms.  There had been widespread 
episodes of pneumonia in the area, so Alter diagnosed the woman with viral pneumonia 
and referred her to a general internist.  Later that day, the internist discovered that the 
woman did not have viral pneumonia, but rather, she was suffering from aspirin toxicity.  
Alter had fallen victim to the availability heuristic (Groopman 2007, 63-66).   
 A second example is of a radiologist who once missed a breast cancer and was 
sued.  After the incident, the particular radiologist became much more aggressive in 
trying to catch breast cancer.  Of all the mammographies that he examined, he called back 
about 15% to 16% of the patients for a biopsy (as opposed to the average of about 10% to 
11%).  This caused unnecessary emotional distress for the women whose tumors turned 
out to be benign, and certainly created unnecessary medical costs (Groopman 2007, 188).  
In this example, it is clear that the availability heuristic can influence physicians in ways 
that negatively affect both patient outcomes and health care costs. 
 Finally, another case of a missed diagnosis suggests that the availability heuristic 
may affect physicians (Redelmeier 2005).  The case involved a patient who was 
complaining of body aches and was running a slight fever.  The physician diagnosed the 
patient with an upper respiratory tract infection, took some blood cultures and sent him 
home.  Later, the blood cultures revealed bacteria in the patient's blood.  The patient did 
not have an upper respiratory tract infection, but rather, he was suffering from 
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osteomyelitis, an infection in his bones.  Redelmeier argues that the availability heuristic 
caused this misdiagnosis.  Since upper respiratory tract infections are very common, 
examples of patients with upper respiratory tract infections easily came to the physician's 
mind.  Luckily, the follow-up test saved the patient's life.   
 The aforementioned anecdotes are consistent with Croskerry's (2009) “Universal 
Model of Diagnostic Reasoning.”  Croskerry argues that physicians use two types of 
reasoning when diagnosing patients. System 1 processing refers to an intuitive approach, 
which relies heavily upon the experience of the physician.  System 1 processing is 
characterized by the use of heuristics, and is generally used when salient features of a 
diagnosis are present.  System 2 processing, on the other hand, refers to a more analytical 
approach.  System 2 processing generally results in less uncertainty, but requires more 
resources, less boundaries, and more ideal conditions.  Ideally, physicians use System 1 
processing to quickly diagnose patients, and then use System 2 processing to monitor and 
sometimes override the System 1 diagnosis.  Croskerry warns, however, that physicians 
often operate under suboptimal conditions, and that “inattentiveness, distraction, fatigue 
and cognitive indolence may diminish System 2 surveillance and allow System 1 too 
much latitude.”  In other words, under suboptimal conditions, the availability heuristic 
may lead physicians to make diagnoses that are incorrect and potentially costly. 
 Finally, Milstein and Adler (2003)  argue that physicians are influenced by what 
they call the “unavailability heuristic.”  They claim that most clinical failures are “subtle 
and not reported by the media,” and that physicians therefore tend to underestimate the 
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likelihood of preventable harm.  Milstein and Adler believe that this explains why 
physicians might continue to use treatments that are ineffective.  They do not offer any 
data to support their position, however.     
 While the anecdotes above suggest that the availability heuristic affects 
physicians, there are few econometric studies testing this concept.  One existing study 
examined 227 patients in a university hospital for whom blood cultures were ordered 
between 1984 and 1985 (Poses et al. 1991).  After the blood samples were taken, 
researchers interviewed the physicians (mostly interns) who had ordered the blood 
samples and asked them to estimate the probability that the samples would be positive for 
bacteremia.  Researchers also asked the physicians about certain recall variables: an 
estimate of the proportion of the physician's patients currently receiving antibiotics, the 
number of patients the physician could recall that had positive blood cultures within the 
past month, and whether the physician felt that he frequently cared for patients with 
bacteremia.  Poses et al. controlled for the severity of the patients' conditions and patient 
demographic factors.  They then used a calibration curve, a receiving operating 
characteristics (ROC) curve, and multivariate regression analysis to analyze the data.  
They concluded that the availability heuristic does in fact exist: there was a  significant 
positive correlation between the physician's estimated probability of bacteremia and the 
proportion of the physician's patients that he estimated were on antibiotics.  In addition, 
physicians who claimed that they frequently treated patients with bacteremia had 
significantly higher estimates of the probability that a given blood culture would be 
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positive.  The study shows that physicians overestimate probabilities of events that are 
common and easily retrievable.  The sample for this study was very limited however.  
Poses et al. only examined physicians from one hospital and many were interns from the 
university. The results might differ for more experienced physicians. 
 A more recent study examined thirty-six residents from Erasmus Medical Centre 
in the Netherlands, half of whom were in their first year of residency, the other half of 
whom were in their second year of residency (Mamede et al. 2010).  Researchers first 
presented eight vignettes of clinical cases based on real patients.  For each case, the 
physicians were given a potential diagnosis and asked to rate the probability that the 
diagnosis was correct.  Then, the physicians were shown eight new cases, some of which 
were similar to those seen earlier, and were asked to form diagnoses as quickly as 
possible.  Diagnoses were then evaluated as fully correct, partially correct, or incorrect, 
and Mamede et al. used analysis of variance (ANOVA) to analyze the results.  They 
found that second-year residents scored significantly lower on cases that were similar to 
cases presented in phase 1.  Second-year residents incorrectly gave the phase 1 diagnoses 
because phase 1 diagnoses were easily retrievable in the residents' minds.  There were no 
such results for first-year residents.  Additionally, Mamede et al. found that going back 
and using analytical reasoning allowed second-year residents to score significantly higher 
in phase 2.  However, this study used a limited sample in a hypothetical situation.  The 
results might not hold true in real-life situations with more experienced doctors. 
 Finally, Camancho, Donkers and Stremersch (2011) examined the availability 
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heuristic's effect on physician prescribing patterns.  They studied a panel data set of 
Dutch general practitioners treating obstructive airways diseases.  They examined eight 
clinically equivalent prescriptions, including a new treatment, Symbicort.  Camancho et 
al. hypothesized that patients who were switched from one treatment to another 
equivalent treatment due to negative side effects would be salient in the physicians' 
minds.  They believed that salient patients would inhibit physicians from prescribing 
certain treatments.  They then developed a quasi-Bayesian learning model and used a 
Markov chain Monte Carlo approach to fit the data to the model.  Indeed, they found 
evidence to support their hypothesis.  They found that patients who switched 
prescriptions received seven to ten times more weight in the physician's mind.  
Camancho et al. concluded that the availability heuristic slows down the adoption of new 
treatments.  This study provides the best evidence of the availability heuristic.  However, 
we would prefer to study whether the availability heuristic affects physicians in the 
hospital setting. 
 Currently, most evidence supporting the availability heuristic is anecdotal or uses 
limited samples in unrealistic contexts.  This study uses a more comprehensive sample 
and studies data about actual physician behavior in a realistic context.  The study also 
provides a more recent analysis of the availability heuristic.  Finally, this study adds to 
existing literature by providing an economic perspective: does the availability heuristic 
lead physicians to incur more unnecessary costs? 
 
16 
 
III. THEORY: 
 
 This study rests upon both psychological and economic theories.  Since 
physicians often make decisions quickly with limited resources, they rely on heuristics, or 
mental shortcuts, to form diagnoses and take action.  One such heuristic is the availability 
heuristic.  The availability heuristic encourages physicians to make decisions based on 
easily-retrievable memories.  Often, availability allows physicians to form diagnoses 
quickly and efficiently because they easily recognize diseases that are common or severe.  
 However, in some cases, the availability heuristic may lead to a misallocation of 
resources.  In theory, salient memories lead a physician to overestimate the probability of 
rare diagnoses or severe patient outcomes.  Consequently, the physician overestimates the 
marginal benefit of certain treatment options.  In this case, the physician performs at a 
point where the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit of the care he provides.   
 For instance, a physician might easily recall a patient who died giving birth 
because such an event is rare and salient.  The physician might then overestimate the 
probability of maternal death for future patients, overestimating the true marginal benefit 
of c-sections.  He would therefore utilize more c-sections than are economically efficient, 
leading to deadweight loss. 
 Figure 2 illustrates this concept.  Assume the marginal cost of a c-section – the 
cost of providing one additional patient with a c-section – is equal to the market price of 
c-sections.  Assume the true marginal benefit – the benefit of providing one additional 
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patient with a c-section – is given by the black line on the left.  Optimally, the physician 
should perform just enough c-sections so that the true marginal benefit equals the true 
marginal cost.  In our example, the physician should optimally perform QEFFICIENT c-
sections.   
 However, suppose the availability heuristic causes the physician to overestimate 
the marginal benefit of c-sections.  His or her perceived marginal benefit is given by the 
grey line on the right.  The physician will perform enough c-sections so that the marginal 
cost of the procedure equals his or her perceived marginal benefit.  In this example, the 
physician will perform QACTUAL c-sections.  He performs more c-sections than are 
efficient, and the marginal cost of these additional c-sections exceeds their marginal 
benefit.  The total excess cost is the deadweight or efficiency loss.   
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IV. OUTCOMES OF INTEREST: 
 
 It is difficult to test whether the availability heuristic leads physicians to accrue 
unnecessary health care costs because it is difficult to define unnecessary healthcare 
costs.  Since there is so much variation in physician practices across the country, there is 
little consensus about which medical procedures lead to higher quality of care and which 
procedures are actually unnecessary.  Nonetheless, in this study we have identified two 
areas in which unnecessary costs can be identified and in which rare, salient outcomes 
exist that might skew physicians' perceptions.  We examine each of these areas separately. 
 In Part I of the study, we examine cesarean sections (c-sections).  The Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), a well-respected Federal agency tasked with 
creating quality metrics to evaluate and analyze hospital care across the United States, 
has identified c-sections as an “overused procedure” (Department of Health and Human 
Services 2007).  From 1996 to 2009, the national cesarean rate (percentage of all births 
that were delivered by c-section) rose from 20.7% to 32.3% (Martin et al. 2011).  This 
increase is important from an economic perspective because c-sections are costly.  C-
sections cost twice as much as vaginal births on average (Baicker et al. 2006).  
Additionally, in comparison to vaginal births, c-sections are associated with higher risks 
for maternal rehospitalization sixty days after the initial discharge (Rochelle et al. 2000).  
It has also been shown that U.S. counties with higher cesarean rates do not have lower 
rates of infant or maternal mortality (Baicker et al. 2006).  There are some patient risk 
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factors that make c-sections necessary in some cases.  For instance, older mothers are 
more likely to have c-sections, and mothers who have had c-sections in the past are also 
more likely to have c-sections for future children (Triunfo et al. 2009).  However, the 
sharp increase in the national cesarean rate from 1996 to 2009 and the lack of correlation 
between regional cesarean rates and health outcomes indicate that many c-sections are 
unnecessary.  Studies on supplier-induced demand claim that physicians' financial 
incentives explain many unnecessary c-sections (Gruber et al. 1996; Triunfo et al. 2009). 
In this study, we explore whether rare, salient outcomes from physicians' past experiences 
are another source of c-section overuse. 
 In Part II of the study we examine negative appendectomies (NA) – cases in 
which a patient had his or her appendix removed but was not ultimately diagnosed with 
appendicitis.  In 1997, 15% of patients who underwent an appendectomy were not 
ultimately diagnosed with appendicitis (Flum and Koepsell 2002).  Considering patients 
whose appendices are removed, those who are negative for appendicitis have longer 
lengths of stay, higher total charges, higher rates of mortality, and higher rates of 
infectious complications than those who are positive for appendicitis (Flum and Koepsell 
2002).  NA is therefore costly.  In this study, we seek to answer whether negative past 
experiences cause physicians to remove more healthy appendices, accumulating more 
unnecessary costs.  
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V. DATA: 
 
 This study uses Pennsylvania inpatient hospital admissions data from 2009.  The 
data come from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) and 
consist of one observation for each discharge from all inpatient facilities in Pennsylvania 
(excluding Veterans Administration Hospitals, Skilled Nursing Facilities and state 
psychiatric hospitals).   The data include demographic information for each patient 
including age, primary insurance status, and race/ethnicity.  The data also classify the 
severity of each patient's condition into one of five groups based on the predicted chance 
of mortality at admission according to the MediQual Atlas.  The data set also includes 
each patient's primary diagnosis and up to eight secondary diagnoses, as well as the 
primary medical procedure performed on each patient and up to five additional 
procedures.   
 The original PHC4 data include hospital characteristics such as the number of 
beds in the hospital and the total number of inpatient hospital discharges during 2009.  
PHC4 also determined nine geographic regions by which they grouped the data.  A map 
of these regions are included in Appendix A.   Finally, the data identify each attending 
physician by Pennsylvania medical license number. 
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V.A. Childbirth 
 
 For Part I of the study, we created a sample according to the technical 
specifications of the AHRQ's Inpatient Quality Indicator (IQI) #33, the primary cesarean 
rate.  As previously stated, the AHRQ is a well-respected, Federal agency run by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.  The AHRQ calculates IQIs to provide 
objective measures of quality of care.  Specifically, IQI #33 measures the use of c-
sections in cases in which there were no abnormalities with the fetus and in which the 
mother had no previous c-sections. 
  As per AHRQ guidelines, we therefore limited our sample to patients who had 
given birth, excluding cases of abnormal fetal presentation, preterm births, fetal deaths, 
multiple gestation and breech births.  We also excluded patients who had undergone 
previous c-sections.  Among the patients included in the sample, we identified those who 
underwent a c-section.  We later calculated the cesarean rate as the number of c-sections 
included in the sample over the total number of patients included in the sample.  Our 
measure of the cesarean rate therefore captures the use of c-sections in patients who were 
eligible for a non-complicated vaginal birth.  In that sense, we might think of our 
definition of the cesarean rate as the rate of unnecessary c-sections in healthy patients.  
Nonetheless, there are other maternal risk factors not captured by our definition that 
could necessitate a c-section.  We will herein refer to our measure as the “unnecessary” 
cesarean rate, but keep in mind that it is an imperfect measure of clinically unnecessary c-
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sections. 
 Within our sample, we defined a bad outcome as a maternal death, an obstetric 
fistula, or a uterine rupture.  An obstetric fistula is tissue damage caused by the pressure 
of childbirth that results in an “abnormal opening between a woman's vagina and bladder 
or rectum (or both)” (USAID 2009).  A uterine rupture occurs when the uterine wall 
separates from the overlying membrane (Nahum 2010).  Both obstetric fistulas and 
uterine ruptures are rare and serious events that generally require an emergency c-section.  
Variable definitions for these and other variables are given in Table 1 in Appendix C.  A 
list of ICD-9 codes used to create the c-section and bad outcome variables are shown in 
Appendix B. 
 In total, we included 104,311 patients for this study.  Of these patients, about 
18.2% underwent a c-section.  There was only one patient death and there were only 7 
obstetric fistulas and 14 uterine ruptures.  By our definition, there were therefore 22 bad 
outcomes in our sample.    Most of the patients in the sample were white (69.1%), while 
15.1% were black, 6.3% were Hispanic, 2.3% were Asian and 9.0% were neither white, 
black, Hispanic, nor Asian.  Over half of the patients in the sample were between the ages 
of 20 and 29 (53.0%).  About one-third of the patients were between the ages of 30 and 
39 (34.1%).  10.6% of patients in the sample were between the ages of 10 and 19, and 
very few patients (2.2%) were above the age of 40.  None of the patients in the sample 
were below the age of 10 or above the age of 59.  Most patients had private insurance 
(55.9%), while a great deal of patients also had Medicaid as their primary insurer 
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(40.4%).  Few patients had Medicare, another source of government insurance, no 
insurance or an unknown source of insurance (1.2%, 1.1%, 1.1% and 0.2%, respectively). 
Finally, the overwhelming majority of patients (99.8%) had no risk at admission.  No 
patients were classified as having maximal risk at admission.  Table 1 in Appendix C 
shows these variable definitions.  Table 2 in Appendix C provides mean values of patient 
characteristics from the sample.  
 Most of the patients in the sample were admitted to a hospital in the southeastern 
region  (Regions 5,7,8,9 – 62.0%) or the southwestern corner of Pennsylvania (Region 1 
– 17.9%).  On average, each hospital had 5,686 total discharges for the year and 399 
hospital beds.  On average, each hospital had less than one (0.54) bad outcome during the 
year.  Table 1 in Appendix C provides these variable definitions.  Table 3 in Appendix C 
provides mean values of hospital characteristics from the sample.  
  Next, we aggregated the data by physician and quarter, so we had one observation 
of the “unnecessary” cesarean rate for each physician during each quarter that he or she 
delivered at least one baby.  In total, there were 1,156 physicians in the first quarter, 
1,156 physicians in the second quarter, 1,188 physicians in the third quarter, and 1,166 
physicians in the fourth quarter with recorded, non-complicated births.  We calculated 
each physician's “unnecessary” cesarean rate for the quarter as the total number of c-
sections over the total number of deliveries that were included in the sample.  We also 
identified the physician's “unnecessary” cesarean rate from the previous quarter as well as 
the total number of bad outcomes from the previous quarter.  For bad outcomes, we 
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examined obstetric fistulas and uterine ruptures separately.  We also examined all bad 
outcomes (maternal deaths, obstetric fistulas, uterine ruptures) aggregated together.   
 The average quarterly “unnecessary” cesarean rate for physicians was about 
18.2%, and the average quarterly number of bad outcomes was about 0.005.   The 
standard deviation of quarterly physician “unnecessary” cesarean rates was 10.3 
percentage points, indicating substantial variation across physicians and quarters.  The 
average standard deviation of a single physician's quarterly cesarean rate across all four 
quarters was 5.0 percentage points, indicating that there is not only variation across 
physicians, but also variation in individual physicians' behaviors over time.  These values 
are shown in Figure 3, as well as in Table 4 in Appendix C.   
 The mean physician “unnecessary” cesarean rate did not fluctuate greatly by 
quarter (Appendix C: Table 5).  Quarter 3 had the lowest mean rate (17.4%), while 
Quarter 1 had the highest mean rate (18.9%).  There was at least one bad outcome in each 
quarter.  Quarter 1 had the lowest average number of bad outcomes per physician (0.001), 
while Quarters 2 and 3 had the highest average number of bad outcomes per physician 
Figure 3:
Summary of Childbirth Variables at the Physician Level
Variable Mean
Physician's Quarterly “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate (%) 18.215 10.299
5.054 3.039
# Maternal Deaths, Uterine Ruptures or Obstetric Fistulas 0.005 0.069
# Uterine Ruptures 0.003 0.055
# Obstetric Fistulas 0.002 0.039
# Physician Births  22.356  16.893 
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Std. Dev.
Std. Dev. of Physician's Quarterly Cesarean Rate Across Quarters
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(0.008).  No physician had more than one bad outcome per quarter.   
 We compared quarterly physician “unnecessary” cesarean rates when there was no 
bad outcome in the previous quarter (17.8%) with quarterly physician “unnecessary” 
cesarean rates when there was a bad outcome in the previous quarter (19.6%).  These 
values are shown in Table 6 in Appendix C.  Although the mean quarterly cesarean rate 
was higher for physicians with a bad outcome in the previous quarter, the difference is 
not statistically significant.  
 Although we would liked to have included physician characteristics such as race 
and number of years of experience in the study, these variables were not available to us.  
Nonetheless, we calculated the physician's total number of deliveries as a proxy for 
physician experience.  We also calculated the physician's average patient composition for 
each quarter: the proportion of the physician's patients who were white, black, Hispanic, 
Asian or of another race; the proportion of the physician's patients whose primary insurer 
was a private insurance company, Medicaid, Medicare, another government provider, 
who were uninsured, or whose insurance status was unknown;  the proportion of the 
physician's patients who were between the ages of 10 and 19, 20 and 29, 30 and 39, 40 
and 49 or 50 and 59; and the proportion of the physician's patients who were categorized 
as no risk, minimal risk, moderate risk or severe risk at admission.  Each of these 
variables was rescaled to range from 0 to 100 as opposed to 0 to 1.  Finally, we also 
calculated mean hospital characteristics for hospitals at which each physician operated 
during the quarter.  Mean, minimum and maximum values of each of these variables 
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appear in Table 4 in Appendix C. 
 
V.B.  Appendicitis: 
 
 In Part II of the study, we limited our sample to all patients who had either been 
diagnosed with appendicitis or who had undergone an appendectomy.  Among these 
patients, we defined a case of NA to be any patient who had an appendectomy but who 
was not ultimately diagnosed with appendicitis.  This variable definition is the definition  
used by Flum and Koepsell (2002).  We defined three bad outcomes.  First, death was 
defined to be any patient with a diagnosis of appendicitis who ultimately died.  Secondly, 
sepsis was defined to be any patient with a diagnosis of appendicitis who also had a 
secondary diagnosis of sepsis or severe sepsis.  Finally, we defined a perforated or 
ruptured appendix to be any patient with a diagnosis of perforated/ruptured appendix.  
Both sepsis and perforation are rare, severe and dangerous complications of appendicitis 
(Marks 2011).  A list of these variable definitions appears in Table 1 in Appendix C.  A 
list of ICD-9 codes used to create these variables is given in Appendix B.   
 We included 17,335 patients in our sample.  Overall, 94.9% of these patients 
underwent an appendectomy, but only 78.7% were ultimately diagnosed with 
appendicitis.  The rate NA was 21.3%.  This rate NA is higher than the rate NA observed 
in Flum and Koepsell's (2002) sample, which was 15.3%.  This rate NA is also much 
higher than an estimate of the national rate NA for 2007, which was 8.5% (Seetahal et al. 
27 
 
2011). 
 Only 0.5% of patients in our sample died from appendicitis.  1.4% of patients in 
the sample went into sepsis and 12.3% of patients in the sample had a perforated or 
ruptured appendix.  By our definition, 13.8% of patients in our sample experienced at 
least one bad outcome.  Note that some patients had multiple bad outcomes.  For 
instance, some patients had a ruptured appendix and then died.  Mean values of patient 
characteristics are shown in Table 7 in Appendix C. 
 The overwhelming majority of patients in the sample were white (82.2%).  8.2% 
of patients were black, 5.1% were Hispanic, 1.2% were Asian, and 4.3% were another 
race. Most patients in the sample had private insurance (60.3%), Medicare (18.4%) or 
Medicaid (15.4%).  More patients in the sample were male (53.6%) than female (46.3%), 
which is surprising because previous studies have shown that women of childbearing age 
are most likely to undergo a negative appendectomy (Flum and Koepsell 2002).  Most 
patients were between the ages of 10 and 69.  Finally, most patients were classified as no 
risk (69.2%) or minimal risk (18.5%) at admission.  Only 3.4% of patients were classified 
as severe or maximal risk at admission.  Table  7 in Appendix C lists mean values of these 
variables at the patient level. 
 Most patients attended a hospital in the southwestern (Region 1 – 21.9%) or the 
southeastern corner of the state (Regions 5, 8, 9 – 46.9%).  On average, the patients in our 
sample attended hospitals that treated 4,964 patients over the year and had 377 hospital 
beds.  Mean values of hospital characteristics are shown in Table 8 in Appendix C. 
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 We then aggregated the data by attending physician and quarter.  We therefore had 
one observation for each physician for each quarter that he or she treated at least one case 
of appendicitis or suspected appendicitis.  We included approximately 1,429 physicians in 
the first quarter, 1,467 physicians in the second quarter, 1,453 physicians in the third 
quarter and 1,417 physicians in the fourth quarter.  On average, each physician only 
treated 2.2 cases of appendicitis and performed 5.8 appendectomies during each quarter.  
In a given quarter, the maximum number of appendicitis cases treated and 
appendectomies performed was 24 and 23 per physician, respectively (Appendix C: Table 
9).  
 We calculated each physician's quarterly rate NA as the number of negative 
appendectomies he or she performed during the quarter over the total number of 
appendectomies he or she performed over the quarter.  (We multiplied each physician's 
rate NA by 100 to simplify the interpretation of our results.)  In addition, we calculated 
the total number of bad outcomes – deaths, sepsis cases and perforated/ruptured 
appendices – that the physician experienced in the quarter.  As in the childbirth portion of 
our study, we examined each of the three bad outcomes separately, as well as all three bad 
outcomes aggregated together.  We also calculated the number of bad outcomes the 
physician experienced in the previous quarter, as well as the physician's rate NA from the 
previous quarter.  On average, about 21.9% of appendices that physicians in our sample 
removed were later deemed to be healthy.  The standard deviation of physicians' quarterly 
rates NA was 38.2 percentage points, indicating substantial variation across physicians 
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and quarters .  Additionally, the mean standard deviation of an individual physician's rate 
NA across quarters was 4.3 percentage points, indicating that there is also small variation 
across quarters for a single physician (Figure 4 and Appendix C: Table 9). 
 Mean rates NA at the physician level did not vary much by quarter.  Quarter 1 had 
the highest mean quarterly rate NA (38.7%), while Quarter 3 had the lowest mean 
quarterly rate NA (36.5%) (Appendix C: Table 10).  On average, each physician 
experienced about  0.4 bad outcomes – appendicitis-related deaths, appendicitis-related 
sepsis cases and perforated or ruptured appendices – per quarter (Figure 4 and Appendix 
C: Table 9).  The mean number of bad outcomes at the physician level did not vary much 
over time.  Quarter 2 had the highest mean number of bad outcomes (0.41), while Quarter 
4 had the fewest (0.38) (Appendix C: Table 10).   
 We also examined the average quarterly rate NA at the physician level based on 
whether or not the physician saw at least one bad outcome in the previous quarter.  We 
used a two-sided t-test to compare the two means.  Results are shown in Table 11 in 
Figure 4:
Summary of Appendicitis Variables at the Physician Level
Variable Mean
Quarterly Rate NA (%) 21.918 38.193
4.307 7.675
# Patient Deaths, Sepsis Cases or Perforations 0.393 0.809
# Deaths 0.014 0.116
# Sepsis Cases 0.041 0.208
# Perforations 0.350 0.776
# Appendectomies 5.783 4.536
# Appendicitis Cases Treated 2.247 3.115
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Std. Dev.
Std. Dev. of a Physician's Quarterly Rate NA Across Quarters
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Appendix C.   For each of our bad outcomes, the mean quarterly rate NA varied 
significantly (at the 0.01 significance level) based on whether or not the physician saw a 
bad outcome in the previous quarter.  Using death or sepsis as our bad outcome, we found 
that a physicians who experienced a bad outcome in the previous quarter had 
significantly higher quarterly rates NA.  On the other hand, using perforation as our bad 
outcome, we found that physicians who experienced a bad outcome in the previous 
quarter had significantly lower quarterly rates NA.   
 Finally, we calculated average hospital and patient characteristics for the 
physician during the quarter.  We calculated the proportion of each physician's patients 
that were white, black, Hispanic, Asian or another race.  We also calculated the 
proportion of each physician's patients that had private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, 
other government insurance, unknown insurance or that were uninsured.  We calculated 
that proportion of the physician's patients that were male or female and between the ages 
of 0 and 4, 5 and 9, 10 and 19, 20 and 29, 30 and 39, 40 and 49, 50 and 59, 60 and 69, 70 
and 79, and 80 and older.  These are the same sex/age bands that were used by Flum and 
Koepsell (2002).  We calculated the proportion of the physician's patients that were 
classified as no risk, minimal risk, moderate risk, severe risk or maximal risk at 
admission according to the MediQual Atlas.  Finally, we calculated the average hospital 
size (total hospital discharges and number of hospital beds) for hospitals where the 
physician operated during the quarter, as well as the hospital region.  All of these 
variables were rescaled to take on values ranging from 0 to 100 rather than 0 to 1.  Mean, 
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minimum, and maximum values of these variables appear in Table 9 in Appendix C. 
 
VI. METHODS: 
  
 Initially, we used multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to 
examine the relationship between physicians' practice patterns (quarterly cesarean rates or 
quarterly rates NA) and bad outcomes from the previous quarter.  An OLS regression was 
appropriate for this study because each of our two dependent variables were continuous 
random variables ranging from 0 to 100.  Equation 1 shows the general form of the 
model. 
[1]   MEASURE OF OVERUSEn,t = β0 + β1BAD OUTCOMEn,t-1 + β2Zn+ ε 
where the subscript n represents the individual physician, subscript t represents the 
quarter, β0, β1, and β2 are the coefficients to be estimated, MEASURE OF OVERUSE is a 
measure of the physician's utilization (either the quarterly “unnecessary” cesarean rate or 
the quarterly rate NA), BAD OUTCOME is the number of bad outcomes the physician 
saw in the previous quarter (obstetric fistula, uterine rupture, death, sepsis, perforation), 
Zn is a vector of the average physician, patient and hospital characteristics for the 
physician, and ε is the error vector.   
 Since a Brush-Pagan test revealed heteroskedasticity in each of our two samples 
(p-value < 0.0001 for both samples), we used robust standard errors in our OLS 
regressions.  Since the availability heuristic decreases over time, we did not examine bad 
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outcomes in quarters beyond the previous quarter 
  We also considered the idea that individual practice patterns might contribute to 
the physician's utilization of medical care.  Each physician has certain immeasurable 
tendencies that affect his or her likelihood of performing a c-section or a negative 
appendectomy and that remain consistent over time.  We could not control for these 
factors in the OLS regression model, so we used a fixed effects regression model to 
examine the data.  In the fixed effects model, we essentially controlled for each 
individual physician to capture the important factors for which we could not control in 
the OLS regression model.  The fixed effects model is given by Equation 2: 
[2]   MEASURE OF OVERUSEn,t = β0 + β1BAD OUTCOMEn,t-1 + β2Zn+ β3Xn + ε 
where n represents the physician, t represents the quarter, MEASURE OF OVERUSE is 
either the physician's quarterly “unnecessary” cesarean rate or quarterly rate NA, BAD 
OUTCOME is the number of bad outcomes from the previous quarter, Z is a vector of 
average patient characteristics, ε is the error vector, and X is the panel variable which 
represents the fact that we controlled for each individual physician.  Again, we used 
robust standard errors.   
 Finally, we decided to examine how much influence each physician has in 
determining whether or not his or her patient receives a c-section or a negative 
appendectomy.  To answer this question, we used our patient-level data and logistic 
regression to test the model given by Equation 3. 
[3] MEDICAL PROCEDUREk = β0 + β1 PHYSICIAN'S UTILIZATION OF MEDICAL 
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PROCEDUREk + β2 Zk+ ε 
where the subscript k is used to indicate each individual patient, MEDICAL 
PROCEDURE is 1 if the patient received the medical procedure of interest (either a c-
section or a negative appendectomy) and 0 otherwise, PHYSICIAN'S UTLIZATION OF 
MEDICAL CARE is the patient's attending physician's quarterly “unnecessary” cesarean 
rate or quarterly rate NA excluding the patient of interest, Z is a vector of other patient 
and hospital characteristics, and ε is the error vector.   
 In all three of our models, we tested the following hypotheses: 
 H0:  β1 = 0 
 Ha:   β1 > 0 
In other words, in the first two models, we hypothesized that bad outcomes from the 
previous quarter would lead physicians to perform more “unnecessary” c-sections or 
more negative appendectomies in the current quarter.  In the third model, we 
hypothesized patients whose physicians have higher utilization rates would be more 
likely to receive an unnecessary c-section or a negative appendectomy than similar 
patients whose physicians have lower utilization rates. 
 
VII. RESULTS:  
VII.A. Childbirth: 
 
 The OLS regression results provide no evidence for the availability heuristic.  
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After  controlling for the physician's previous cesarean rate, the number of deliveries the 
physician performed, patient race, patient age, patient insurance status, patient risk at 
admission, hospital size, and hospital region, we found no statistically significant 
relationship between bad outcomes in the previous quarter and the physician's quarterly 
cesarean rate (Figure 5).  The full regression results are shown in Table 12 in Appendix 
D.   
 The OLS regression results show us that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between bad outcomes in previous quarters and the physician's cesarean rate 
in the current quarter.  However, it is interesting to note that the physician's cesarean rate 
from the previous quarter is significantly correlated with the physician's cesarean rate in 
the current quarter.  Given the same patient composition, hospital size, and hospital 
region, a physician with a one percentage point higher cesarean rate in the previous 
quarter has about a 0.4 percentage point higher cesarean rate in the current quarter 
(Figure 5).  This indicates that there is variation in physicians' utilization of c-sections 
Figure 5:
OLS Regression Results for Physician's “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate 
as Predicted by the Number of Bad Outcomes from the Previous Quarter
and the Physician's Previous “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate
Variable: Coefficient Std. Error
Uterine Rupture, Obstetric Fistula or Patient Death -1.561 1.873
Uterine Rupture -0.667 2.008
Obstetric Fistula -2.883 3.983
Physician's “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate from Previous Quarter 0.439 0.040
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: None of the relationships are statistically significant at the 0.10 significance level.
Note: Using robust standard errors.
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that remains fairly consistent over time.     
 In the fixed effects regression, we controlled for the unchanging, unobserved 
characteristics of each individual physician, and only looked at variation in each 
physician's cesarean rate across quarters (Appendix D: Table 13).  We controlled for 
patient factors that might affect the cesarean rate (race, age, insurance status, and risk at 
admission), and looked at the impact of bad outcomes in the previous quarter on the 
current quarterly “unnecessary” cesarean rate.  Once again, we found no evidence to 
support our initial hypotheses (Figure 6).   
 Our results are interesting, however, in that the only statistically significant 
predictors of the physician's cesarean rate are the proportion of the physician's patient's 
aged 50 or older, the proportion of the physician's patients on Medicare or other 
government insurance (excluding Medicaid), and the proportion of the physician's 
patients categorized as severe risk.  For the most part, patient factors were not statistically 
significantly correlated with the physician's cesarean rate.  This finding might suggest 
that variation in the use of c-sections is not due solely to patient factors.  Rather, much of  
Figure 6:
Fixed Effects Regression Results for Physician's “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate 
as Predicted by the Number of Bad Outcomes from the Previous Quarter
Bad Outcome Defined As: Coefficient Std. Error
Uterine Rupture, Obstetric Fistula or Patient Death -2.525 2.527
Uterine Rupture -2.633 3.214
Obstetric Fistula -2.367 4.112
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: None of the relationships are statistically significant at the 0.10 significance level.
Note: Using robust standard errors.
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the variation is simply due to physician discretion. 
 We decided to further investigate this phenomenon.  How much influence do 
physicians have in determining whether or not patients receive c-sections?  The results 
from the logistic regression are shown in Figure 7 and in Table 14 in Appendix D.  
Indeed, we found a statistically significant relationship (at the 0.01 significance level) 
between the physician's quarterly cesarean rate and the patient's probability of having a c-
section.  Consider two patients of the same race, age and risk status at the same hospital. 
The patient whose physician has a one percentage point higher quarterly “unnecessary” 
cesarean rate has a 2.5% higher predicted chance of having a c-section.  Our results 
therefore suggest that physician practice patterns play a major role in determining health 
care utilization.  However, the availability heuristic does not appear to explain variations 
in physician practice patterns.  It is still unclear what drives such variations.  
 The physician's cesarean rate is not the only factor that influences a patient's 
chance of having a c-section, however.  As we would expect, a patient's age, risk at 
admission and complications during childbirth also impact her chance of having a c-
Figure 7:
Logistic Regression Results for Patient's Probability of Having an “Unnecessary”
C-Section as Predicted by Her Physician's “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate
and Her Insurance Status
Variable Odds Ratio Std. Error
Physician's Quarterly “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate  1.025  0.001 
Medicaid* 0.791 0.019
Other Government Insurance (excluding Medicare or Medicaid)* 0.710 0.077
Uninsured* 0.739 0.079
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: All relationships are statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level.
*Odds ratios in comparison to private insurance.
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section.  Another interesting finding is that patients with Medicaid, other government 
insurance, or no insurance have statistically significantly lower predicted chances of 
having a c-section than patients with private insurance (Figure 7).  The difference is 
between 20% and 30%! This is interesting because Medicaid and the uninsured typically 
compensates physicians less than private insurers (Cowen 2010).  The findings therefore 
suggest that physicians' financial incentives might alter their tendencies to utilize c-
sections.  
 
VII.B. Appendicitis: 
  
 Our OLS regression results indicate that bad outcomes in the previous quarter 
might affect a physician's rate NA in the current quarter (Figure 8 and Appendix D: Table 
15).  There is a statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) positive correlation between the 
number of perforations that a physician treated in the previous quarter and the physician's 
rate NA in the current quarter.  All else equal, physicians with one additional perforation 
from the previous quarter have about a 0.8 percentage-point higher rate NA in the current 
quarter.  However, the number of appendicitis-related deaths or appendicitis-related 
sepsis cases a physician experienced in the previous quarter is not significantly correlated 
with the physician's quarterly rate NA.  Therefore, the OLS regression results imply that 
the availability heuristic might negatively impact a physician's performance, but only 
under certain circumstances.  
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 Another interesting finding from the OLS regressions is that hospital size is 
positively correlated (at the 0.01 significance level) with the physician's quarterly rate 
NA.  A physician operating in a hospital with 100 additional patient discharges for the 
year has about a 0.1 percentage point higher quarterly rate NA.  This result might indicate 
that physicians working in larger, busier hospitals spend less time using diagnostic tests 
before operating.  Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effect is small.  
 In our fixed effects regression results, we no longer see a significant correlation 
between the number of previous perforations and the physician's current quarterly rate 
NA (Figure 9 and Appendix D: Table 16).  This new-found lack of correlation might 
indicate that the type of physician that both treats perforated appendices and performs 
more negative appendectomies is the type of physician who takes on more complicated, 
urgent cases.  By controlling for each individual physician, we therefore see that it is not 
necessarily a perforated appendix from the previous quarter that caused the physician to 
perform more negative appendectomies.  Instead, it seems that there are other physician-
specific factors that influence both the number of perforated appendices each physician 
Figure 8:
OLS Regression Results for Physician's Quarterly Rate NA as
Predicted by the Number of Bad Outcomes from the Previous Quarter
and by Total Hospital Discharges where the Physician Operates
Variable: Coefficient Std. Error
# Patient Deaths, Sepsis Cases or Perforations 0.699 * 0.410
# Patient Deaths 1.373 4.135
# Sepsis Cases -2.290 2.061
# Perforations 0.832 ** 0.419
Total Hospital Discharges (100 Patients) 0.103 *** 0.037
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels, respectively.
Note: Using robust standard errors.
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treats and the number of negative appendectomies he performs. 
 On the other hand, our fixed effects regression results indicate that the number of 
patient deaths a physician witnesses in the previous quarter is positively correlated with 
his or her quarterly rate NA (at the 0.05 significance level).  When a given physician has 
seen one death in the previous quarter, his or her quarterly rate NA is about 3.6 
percentage points higher than when he or she has seen zero deaths in the previous quarter.  
This correlation suggests that a patient death (which is the most severe of our three bad 
outcomes) remains salient in the physician's mind and might cause him or her to remove 
more healthy appendices than he or she normally would.  An appendicitis-related death 
appears to be an event that triggers the availability heuristic.  However, the magnitude of 
the impact is relatively small.  Recall that the physicians in our sample performed a 
maximum of 23 appendectomies per quarter.  This means that a death from the previous 
quarter would only lead a physician to perform up to 23*0.03642 = 0.8 additional 
negative appendectomies on average.   
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 Finally, we investigated the extent to which a patient's chance of having a 
negative appendectomy relies on his or her physician.  We performed a logistic regression 
on whether each patient had a negative appendectomy based on the physician's quarterly 
rate NA (excluding the given patient) and other patient characteristics.  The results are 
shown in Table 17 in Appendix D.  We see that the physician's quarterly rate NA is a 
statistically significant (at the 0.01 significance level) predictor of whether or not a 
patient has a negative appendectomy.  For two nearly identical patients, the patient whose 
doctor has a one percentage-point higher quarterly rate NA has a 5.6% higher chance of 
having his or her healthy appendix removed.  This result implies that physician practice 
patterns are important determinants of how patients are treated.  Patient factors cannot 
explain all of the variation we see in the utilization of appendectomies across the state. 
Figure 9:
Fixed Effects Regression Results for Physician's Quarterly Rate NA as
Predicted by the Number of Bad Outcomes from the Previous Quarter
Bad Outcome Defined as: Coefficient Std. Error
# Patient Deaths, Sepsis Cases or Perforations 0.475 0.422
# Patient Deaths** 3.632 1.622
# Sepsis Cases -1.840 1.402
# Perforations 0.586 0.444
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: ** indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 significance level, respectively.
Note: Using robust standard errors.
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 One last interesting finding from the logistic regression results is that uninsured 
patients are about 53.3% less likely to have a negative appendectomy than patients with 
private insurance (at the 0.05 significance level).  There are multiple possible 
explanations for this finding.  For instance, perhaps uninsured patients wait longer to seek 
medical care, decreasing the probability of misdiagnosis.  However, this finding might 
also indicate that physicians are less willing to perform potentially unnecessary 
procedures when they know they will not be fully reimbursed.  This finding could 
indicate that physicians' financial incentives contribute to variations in health care 
practices.  
 
VIII. LIMITATIONS: 
 
 This study was subject to many limitations that we must keep in mind when 
interpreting the results.  First of all, in our data set, we were unable to attain certain 
information for which we would like to have controlled.  Most importantly, in order to 
protect patients' confidentiality, our data excluded patients' dates of admission and dates 
of discharge.  Since the strength of the availability heuristic decreases over time, we 
Figure 10:
Logistic Regression Results for Patient's Probability of Having a Negative Appendectomy
as Predicted by the Physician's Rate NA and Patient Insurance Status
Variable Odds Ratio Std. Error
Physician's Quarterly Rate NA  1.056  ***  0.001 
Uninsured* 0.465 ** 0.148
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: **,*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels, respectively.
*Odds ratio is in comparison to private insurance.
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would like to have controlled for the exact length of time between one bad outcome and 
the next procedure a physician performed.  Instead, we estimated the timing of events by 
the quarter in which they occurred.  This estimation may have skewed our results.  For 
instance, immediately after witnessing an obstetric fistula, physicians may actually 
perform more c-sections, but the effect might wear off by the next quarter.  Our results 
show no correlation between past obstetric fistulas and future c-sections, but there may in 
fact be an immediate effect that we could not capture with our data. 
 Additionally, we had limited knowledge about the physicians in our sample.  It 
seems plausible that less experienced physicians might be more susceptible to the 
availability heuristic than their more experienced counterparts.  For instance, the first 
uterine rupture a physician witnesses is likely more salient than the the tenth uterine 
rupture he treats.  Additionally, physicians with different specialties and physicians of 
different ages, ethnicities and backgrounds might respond differently to negative events.  
Since we could not control for these factors in our OLS regressions, our OLS regression 
results are subject to omitted variable bias.  Although these factors are implicitly 
controlled for in our fixed effects regressions, we would like to have been able to control 
for more physician characteristics in our OLS regressions.  Additionally we would like to 
have examined interaction effects among physician characteristics, bad outcomes and 
future physician behavior.  Future studies should include such characteristics. 
 A third limitation was our lack of clinical knowledge.  In our quest to unveil the 
availability heuristic, we chose events that we thought to be rare and salient – patient 
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deaths, obstetric fistulas, uterine ruptures, sepsis and perforated appendices.  However, 
these events might not have been salient enough to trigger the availability heuristic.  
There may be other clinical situations in which availability is more prevalent.   
 This study was also limited in that our sample was not representative of the entire 
United States' physician workforce.  This study only used data from Pennsylvania in 
2009.  The training that physicians from other states receive and the cultures in which 
physicians from other states operate might impact the way those physicians react to bad 
outcomes.  We cannot necessarily extrapolate the results of this study to other states.   
 Finally, there may actually be a difference in physicians' quarterly “unnecessary” 
cesarean rates or physicians' quarterly rates NA based on whether or not they witnessed 
bad outcomes in the previous quarter, but the difference may have been too small to 
detect.  The smaller the difference, the lower the power of our study and the greater the 
chance of making a Type II error.  In other words, for small differences, the probability 
that we would fail to detect a difference given one truly exists is high.  However, from a 
practical standpoint, a Type II error is not of much concern.  The purpose of this study 
was to determine whether the availability heuristic is a significant driver of unnecessary 
medical costs.  If the availability heuristic does actually lead to more unnecessary costs, 
but at a rate that is too small too detect, we would still say that the availability heuristic is 
not a significant driver of costs.   
 
IX. Conclusions 
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 Experimental evidence has shown that the availability heuristic impacts physician 
behavior.  However, this study shows that effect of the availability heuristic is not very 
meaningful from a broad, economic perspective.  We searched for evidence of the 
availability heuristic under five different scenarios.  We looked at the impact of past 
uterine ruptures and obstetric fistulas on physicians' cesarean rates, as well as the impact 
of past appendicitis-related deaths, appendicitis-related sepsis cases and perforated or 
ruptured appendices on physicians' rates NA.  We only found evidence of the availability 
heuristic in one of these cases.  Our results show that when physicians witness an 
appendicitis-related death, they may perform more negative appendectomies in the 
following quarter.  Still, the magnitude of the increase is quite small – their quarterly rate 
NA only rises by about 3.6 percentage points on average.  Additionally, our OLS 
regression results contradict these findings, so we are not fully confident that availability 
heuristic impacts physicians' utilization trends in any way. 
 We can conclude that the events that trigger the availability heuristic in the health 
care setting (if such events exist) are quite rare.  When they do occur, the magnitude of 
their impact on physician behavior is relatively small.  We conclude that the availability 
heuristic is not a significant driver of health care costs in the United States. 
 Nonetheless, this study documents significant variations in physician practices 
that are not due to patient characteristics. We have shown that physicians play a large role 
in determining health care costs.  A patient's probability of having a c-section is strongly 
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correlated with her physician's “unnecessary” cesarean rate.  Likewise, a patient's 
probability of having a negative appendectomy is strongly correlated with his or her 
physician's rate NA.   
 This study shows that the availability heuristic does not seem to have a significant 
influence on variations in health care practices or health care spending across the United 
States for c-sections or negative appendectomies.  However, we have found some clues as 
to what might drive such variations.  This study provides some evidence that physicians' 
financial incentives contribute to excessive health care spending.  Physicians are more 
likely to perform unnecessary c-sections on patients with private insurance than they are 
on patients with Medicaid, other government insurance, or the uninsured (at the 0.01 
significance level).  Similarly, physicians are more likely to perform negative 
appendectomies on patients with private insurance than on the uninsured (at the 0.05 
significance level).  These results are interesting because private insurers typically 
compensate physicians much better than government insurance programs or the 
uninsured.  These results therefore imply that physicians are more willing to perform 
unnecessary procedures when they are reimbursed at a higher rate.  Policymakers should 
further investigate physicians' financial incentives and possible reforms in order to 
contain health care costs in the United States.   
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APPENDICES: 
Appendix A: Hospital Regions Defined by PHC4: 
 
Appendix B:
ICD-9 Codes Used for Variable Definitions:
Variable ICD-9 Codes
C-Section
Birth
Obstetric Fistula ICD-9 Diagnosis Codes: 6190, 6191, 6192, 6193, 6198, 6199
Uterine Rupture ICD-9 Diagnosis Codes: 66510, 66511
Appendectomy ICD-9 Procedure Codes: 47, 470, 4701, 4709
Appendicitis ICD-9 Diagnosis Codes: 540, 5400, 5401, 5409, 541, 542
Death Discharge Status = 20
Sepsis ICD-9 Diagnosis Codes: 99591, 99592
Perforated or Ruptured Appendix ICD-9 Diagnosis Code: 5400
MS-DRG: 765, 766
ICD-9 Procedure Codes: 740, 741, 742, 740, 7499
Exclude ICD-9 Procedure Code: 7491, 7251, 7252, 7253, 7254
Exclude ICD-9 Diagnosis Codes: 64420, 64421, 65100, 65101, 65103, 65110, 65111, 
65113, 65120, 65121, 65123, 65130, 65131, 65133, 65140, 65141, 65143, 65150, 
65151, 65153, 65160, 65161, 65163, 65180, 65181, 65183, 65190, 65191, 65193, 
65220, 65221, 65223, 65230, 65231, 65233, 65240, 65241, 65243, 65260, 65261, 
65263, 65640, 65641, 65643, 66050, 66051, 66053, 66230, 66231, 66233, 66960, 
66961, 67810, 67811, 67813, 7615, V271, V272, V273, V274, V275, V276, V277
MS-DRG: 765, 766, 767, 768, 774, 775
Exclude ICD-9 Procedure Codes: 7251, 7252, 7253, 7254
Exclude ICD-9 Diagnosis Codes: 64420, 64421, 65100, 65101, 65103, 65110, 65111, 
65113, 65120, 65121, 65123, 65130, 65131, 65133, 65140, 65141, 65143, 65150, 
65151, 65153, 65160, 65161, 65163, 65180, 65181, 65183, 65190, 65191, 65193, 
65220, 65221, 65223, 65230, 65231, 65233, 65240, 65241, 65243, 65260, 65261, 
65263, 65640, 65641, 65643, 66050, 66051, 66053, 66230, 66231, 66233, 66960, 
66961, 67810, 67811, 67813, 7615, V271, V272, V273, V274, V275, V276, V277
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Appendix C. Tables of Definitions and Summary Statistics 
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Table 1:
Variable Definitions at the Patient Level
Variable Name Variable Definition
C-Section
Birth
Obstetric Fistula
Uterine Rupture
Maternal Death
Appendectomy
Appendicitis
Perforation
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other Race
Private Insurance
Medicare
Medicaid
Uninsured
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data, PHC4 2009
1 if patient had a c-section (excluding cases of hysterectomy, abnormal presentation, 
preterm, fetal death, multiple gestation or breech birth)
0 otherwise
1 if patient gave birth (excluding cases of abnormal presentation, preterm, fetal 
death, multiple gestation, or breech birth)
0 otherwise
1 if patient had an obstetric fistula
0 otherwise
1 if patient had a uterine rupture
0 otherwise
1 if birth=1 and patient died
0 otherwise
1 if patient had an appendectomy
0 otherwise
1 if patient had a primary or secondary diagnosis of appendicitis
0 otherwise
Negative 
Appendectomy
1 if appendectomy=1 and appendicitis=0
0 otherwise
Appendicitis-
Related Sepsis
1 if appendicitis=1 and patient had sepsis
0 otherwise
1 if patient had a perforated or ruptured appendix
0 otherwise
1 if patient is white
0 otherwise
1 if patient is black
0 otherwise
1 if patient is Hispanic
0 otherwise
1 if patient is Asian
0 otherwise
1 if patient is other race
0 otherwise
1 if patient has private primary insurance
0 otherwise
1 if patient has Medicare as primary insurance
0 otherwise
1 if patient has Medicaid as primary insurance
0 otherwise
Other Government 
Insurance
1 if patient has other government insurance as primary insurance
0 otherwise
1 if patient is uninsured
0 otherwise
Unknown 
Insurance
1 if primary insurance for patient is unknown
0 otherwise
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Table 1 (continued):
Variable Definitions at the Patient Level
Variable Name Variable Definition
Age X-Y
Female Age X-Y
Male Age X-Y
No Risk
Minimal Risk
Moderate Risk
Severe Risk
Maximal Risk
Region 1
Region 2
Region 4
Region 5
Region 6
Region 7
Region 8
Region 9
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data, PHC4 2009
1 if X ≤ age ≤ Y
0 otherwise
1 if patient is female and X ≤ age ≤ Y
0 otherwise
1 if patient is male and X ≤ age ≤ Y
0 otherwise
1 if Medivual predicted chance of death at admission ranged from 0.000 to 0.001
0 otherwise
1 Medivual predicted chance of death at admission ranged from 0.002 to 0.011
0 otherwise
1 if Medivual predicted chance of death at admission ranged from 0.012 to 0.057
0 otherwise
1 if Medivual predicted chance of death at admission ranged from 0.058 to 0.499
0 otherwise
1 if Medivual predicted chance of death at admission ranged from 0.500 to 1.000
0 otherwise
1 if patient attended hospital in one of the following PA counties: Allegheny, 
Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Greene, Washington
0 otherwise
1 if patient attended hospital in one of the following PA counties: Cameron, Clarion, 
Clearfield, Crawford, Elk, Erie, Forest, Jefferson, McKean, Mercer, Potter, Venango, 
Warren
0 otherwise
1 if patient attended hospital in one of the following PA counties: Centre, Clinton, 
Columbia, Lycoming, Mifflin, Montour, Northumberland, Snyder, Tioga, Union
0 otherwise
1 if patient attended hospital in one of the following PA counties: Adams, 
Cumberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Fulton, Huntingdon, Juniata, Lancaster, Lebanon, 
Perry, York
0 otherwise
1 if patient attended hospital in one of the following PA counties: Bradford, 
Lackawanna, Luzerne, Monroe, Pike, Sullivan, Susquehanna, Wayne, Wyoming
0 otherwise
1 if patient attended hospital in one of the following PA counties: Berks, Carbon, 
Lehigh, Northampton, Schuylkill
0 otherwise
1 if patient attended hospital in one of the following PA counties: Bucks, Chester, 
Delaware, Montgomery
0 otherwise
1 if patient attended hospital in Philadelphia
0 otherwise
Total Hospital 
Discharges (100 
patients)
Total number of hospital inpatient discharges during 2009 for the hospital the patient 
attended (in units of 100 patients)
Hospital Bed Count 
(100 beds)
Total number of hospital beds for the hospital the patient attended (in units of 100 
beds)
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Table 2:
Variable Mean
Patient Outcome:
Had a C-section 18.215%  0.386 
Had a Fistula, Rupture or Death 0.021%  0.015 
Obstetric Fistula 0.007%  0.008 
Uterine Rupture 0.013%  0.012 
Patient Race:
White 69.083%  0.462 
Black 15.170%  0.359 
Hispanic 6.276%  0.243 
Asian 2.251%  0.148 
Other Race 8.993%  0.286 
Patient Age:
Age 10-19 10.628%  0.308 
Age 20-29 53.014%  0.499 
Age 30-39 34.133%  0.474 
Age 40-49 2.222%  0.147 
Age 50-59 0.004%  0.006 
Patient Primary Insurance Status:
Private Insurance 55.947%  0.496 
Medicare 1.242%  0.111 
Medicaid 40.367%  0.491 
Other Government Insurance 1.096%  0.104 
Uninsured 1.135%  0.106 
Unknown Insurance 0.183%  0.043 
No Risk 99.769%  0.048 
Minimal Risk 0.216%  0.046 
Moderate Risk 0.013%  0.012 
Severe Risk 0.001%  0.004 
Maximal Risk 0.000%  -   
n 104,311
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Summary of Patient Characteristics at the Patient Level for Childbirth 
Sample
Std. Dev.
Patient Risk at Admission (MediQual Atlas):
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Table 3:
Variable Mean 
Outcomes at Hospital Level:
Unnecessary C-Sections (%)* 18.215 4.124
Fistula, Rupture or Death* 0.540 0.832
Hospital Size:
Total Hospital Discharges (100 patients) 56.856 29.998
Hospital Bed Count (100 beds) 3.994 2.211
Hospital Region:
Region 1 17.869% 0.383
Region 2 6.367% 0.244
Region 3 3.360% 0.180
Region 4 4.611% 0.210
Region 5 15.301% 0.360
Region 6 5.840% 0.235
Region 7 10.288% 0.304
Region 8 22.215% 0.416
Region 9 14.150% 0.349
n 104311
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*Weighted by number of deliveries at the hospital.
Summary of Hospital Characteristics at the Patient Level for Childbirth 
Sample
Std. Dev.
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Table 4:
Summary of Patient and Hospital Characteristics at the Physician Level for Childbirth Sample
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
Physician Experience:
vuarterly Physician “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate (%) 18.215 10.299 0 100
5.054 3.039 0 50
Maternal Death, Uterine Rupture or Obstetric Fistula 0.005 0.069 0 1
Uterine Rupture 0.003 0.055 0 1
Obstetric Fistula 0.002 0.039 0 1
Physician Births  22.356  16.893 1 175
Racial Composition of Physician's Patients:
White  70.667  29.374 0 100
Black  14.303  21.768 0 100
Hispanic  5.971  14.550 0 100
Asian  2.068  5.695 0 100
Other Race  8.604  14.794 0 100
Age Composition of Physician's Patients:
Age 10-19  10.943  14.292 0 100
Age 20-29  53.532  21.018 0 100
Age 30-39  33.296  21.483 0 100
Age 40-49  2.224  5.394 0 100
Age 50-59  0.006  0.234 0 14
Primary Insurance Composition of 
Physician's Patients:
Private Insurance  54.558  30.620 0 100
Medicare  1.360  5.858 0 100
Medicaid  41.404  30.369 0 100
Other Government Insurance  1.183  4.030 0 100
Uninsured  1.295  4.996 0 100
Unknown Insurance  0.159  1.419 0 36
Risk Composition of Physician's Patients:
No Risk  99.754  1.704 50 100
Minimal Risk  0.229  1.657 0 50
Moderate Risk  0.012  0.258 0 10
Severe Risk  0.005  0.283 0 17
Hospital Size where Physician Operates:
Total Hospital Discharges (100 patients)  55.287  30.204 2.87 145.46
Hospital Bed Counts (100 beds)  3.866  2.163 0.25 15.72
Hospital Region where Physician Operates:
Region 1  19.753  39.811 0 100
Region 2  6.325  24.321 0 100
Region 3  3.408  18.146 0 100
Region 4  6.281  24.264 0 100
Region 5  16.962  37.513 0 100
Region 6  5.230  22.266 0 100
Region 7  10.032  30.046 0 100
Region 8  21.058  40.749 0 100
Region 9  10.951  31.212 0 100
n 4,665
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: Patient variables and hospital regions rescaled to range from 0 to 100 instead of 0 to 1
Std. Dev.
Std. Dev. of Physician's Cesarean Rate across vuarters
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Table 6:
Quarterly Cesarean Rates at the Physician Level by Bad Outcomes in the Previous Quarter
Bad Outcome: Mean Mean
Maternal Death, Uterine Rupture or Obstetric Fistula  17.835  0.260  19.559  2.253 
Uterine Rupture  17.834  0.260  20.539  2.358 
Obstetric Fistula  17.845  0.260  17.599  5.118 
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: None of the differences are statistically significant at the 0.1 level.
Quarterly Cesarean Rate if 
No Bad Outcome in 
Previous Quarter
Quarterly Cesarean Rate if 
One Bad Outcome in 
Previous Quarter
Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
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Table 7:
Variable Mean
Patient Outcomes:
Had an Appendectomy 94.906%  0.220 
Had Appendicitis 78.691%  0.410 
Had a Negative Appendectomy 21.309%  0.410 
Had a Perforated Appendix, Sepsis or Died 13.770%  0.345 
Died 0.479%  0.069 
Sepsis 1.431%  0.119 
Perforated Appendix 12.258%  0.328 
Patient Race:
White 82.198%  0.383 
Black 8.215%  0.275 
Hispanic 5.134%  0.221 
Asian 1.246%  0.111 
Other Race 4.280%  0.202 
Patient Primary Insurance Status:
Private Insurance 60.306%  0.489 
Medicare 18.373%  0.387 
Medicaid 15.368%  0.361 
Other Government Insurance 1.361%  0.116 
Uninsured 4.067%  0.198 
Unknown Insurance 0.427%  0.065 
Patient Sex and Age:
Female 46.363%  0.499 
Age 0-4 0.387%  0.062 
Age 5-9 1.719%  0.130 
Age 10-19 7.413%  0.262 
Age 20-29 7.107%  0.257 
Age 30-39 5.913%  0.236 
Age 40-49 6.444%  0.246 
Age 50-59 6.565%  0.248 
Age 60-69 5.042%  0.219 
Age 70-79 3.444%  0.182 
Age 80+ 2.331%  0.151 
Male 53.637%  0.499 
Age 0-4 0.433%  0.066 
Age 5-9 2.348%  0.151 
Age 10-19 10.412%  0.305 
Age 20-29 8.365%  0.277 
Age 30-39 5.896%  0.236 
Age 40-49 6.242%  0.242 
Age 50-59 7.494%  0.263 
Age 60-69 6.392%  0.245 
Age 70-79 3.952%  0.195 
Age 80+ 2.106%  0.144 
No Risk 69.221%  0.462 
Minimal Risk 18.545%  0.389 
Moderate Risk 8.868%  0.284 
Severe Risk 3.182%  0.176 
Maximal Risk 0.183%  0.043 
n  17,335 
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
 Summary of Patient Characteristics at the Patient Level for 
Appendicitis Sample
Std. Dev.
Patient Risk at Admission (MediQual Atlas):
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Table 8:
Variable Mean
Outcomes at the Hospital Level:
Rate NA* 22.465%  0.172 
Patient Death, Sepsis or Perforation*  27.217  22.037 
Hospital Size:
Total Hospital Discharges (100 patients)  49.644  32.523 
Total Hospital Beds (100 beds)  3.771  2.810 
Hospital Region:
Region 1 21.915%  0.414 
Region 2 6.236%  0.242 
Region 3 4.021%  0.196 
Region 4 4.378%  0.205 
Region 5 12.847%  0.335 
Region 6 6.870%  0.253 
Region 7 9.628%  0.295 
Region 8 19.879%  0.399 
Region 9 14.226%  0.349 
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*Weighted by number of appendicitis/appendectomy patients.
          
Appendicitis Sample
Std. Dev.
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Table 9:
Summary of Patient and Hospital Characteristics at the Physician Level for Appendicitis Sample
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
   
Ph
ys
ic
ia
n 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e: vuarterly Rate NA 21.918 38.193 0 100
4.307 7.675 0 50
# Patient Deaths, Sepsis or Perforations 0.393 0.809 0 8
# Deaths 0.014 0.116 0 1
# Sepsis Cases 0.041 0.208 0 3
# Perforation 0.350 0.776 0 8
# Appendectomies 5.783 4.536 0 23
# Appendicitis Cases Treated 2.247 3.115 0 24
White  82.706  32.633 0 100
Black  8.628  24.235 0 100
Hispanic  0.039  0.159 0 1
Asian  1.142  8.505 0 100
Other Race  3.550  14.689 0 100
Private Insurance  53.504  41.912 0 100
Medicare  26.879  39.587 0 100
Medicaid  14.236  28.464 0 100
Other Government Insurance  1.347  9.322 0 100
Uninsured  3.539  14.134 0 100
Unknown Insurance  0.389  5.121 0 100
Se
x 
an
d 
Ag
e 
Co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 P
hy
si
ci
an
's
 P
at
ie
nt
s:
Female
Age 0-4  0.393  5.497 0 100
Age 5-9  1.219  8.406 0 100
Age 10-19  5.325  16.786 0 100
Age 20-29  6.146  18.658 0 100
Age 30-39  5.354  17.690 0 100
Age 40-49  6.192  19.400 0 100
Age 50-59  7.093  21.286 0 100
Age 60-69  6.247  20.661 0 100
Age 70-79  5.123  19.781 0 100
Age 80+  3.845  17.481 0 100
Male
Age 0-4  0.390  5.303 0 100
Age 5-9  1.463  8.865 0 100
Age 10-19  6.920  18.908 0 100
Age 20-29  6.287  18.007 0 100
Age 30-39  4.562  15.367 0 100
Age 40-49  6.188  19.203 0 100
Age 50-59  9.020  24.231 0 100
Age 60-69  8.918  25.203 0 100
Age 70-79  6.066  21.499 0 100
Age 80+  3.248  15.942 0 100
n 6,071
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Std. Dev.
Std. Dev. of vuarterly Rate NA Over Time
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Note: Patient variables and hospital regions recaled to range from 0 to 100 instead of 0 to 1
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Table 9 (continued):
Summary of Patient and Hospital Characteristics at the Physician Level for Appendicitis Sample
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
No Risk  56.859  44.383 0 100
Minimal Risk  23.223  37.054 0 100
Moderate Risk  14.120  32.076 0 100
Severe Risk  5.450  21.122 0 100
Maximal Risk  0.348  5.589 0 100
Total Hospital Discharges (100 Patients)  50.598  33.026 0 145.46
Hospital Beds (100 beds)  4.019  3.066 0.1 15.72
Region 1  22.936  42.010 0 100
Region 2  7.936  26.987 0 100
Region 3  4.261  20.190 0 100
Region 4  4.475  20.668 0 100
Region 5  12.204  32.720 0 100
Region 6  9.514  29.286 0 100
Region 7  9.042  28.550 0 100
Region 8  15.469  36.066 0 100
Region 9  14.163  34.806 0 100
n 6,071
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Std. Dev.
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Note: Patient variables and hospital regions recaled to range from 0 to 100 instead of 0 to 1
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Appendix D:  Regression Results 
 
 
 
Table 11:
Bad Outcome Defined As: Mean Mean
Perforated Appendix, Sepsis or Death***  42.022  47.807  35.423  46.327 
Death***  30.269  43.849  44.856  48.704 
Sepsis***  31.218  44.259  43.545  48.525 
Perforated or Ruptured Appendix***  41.639  47.735  35.488  46.354 
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*** indicates statistically significant difference at the 0.01 level
Mean Physician Rates NA by Whether the Physician Witnessed a Bad Outcome in the Previous 
Quarter
Quarterly Rate NA if No 
Bad Outcome in Previous 
Quarter
Quarterly Rate NA if at 
Least One Bad Outcome 
in Previous Quarter
Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
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Table 12:
Robust OLS Regression Results for Effect of Previous Bad Outcomes on Current Quarterly Cesarean Rate at the Physician Level
Bad Outcome Defined as: Rupture, Fistula or Death Uterine Rupture Obstetric Fistula
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Physician Experience:
Bad Outcome in Previous vuarter -1.561 1.873 -0.667 2.008 -2.883 3.983
“Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate in Previous vuarter 0.439 0.040 *** 0.439 0.040 *** 0.439 0.040 ***
Deliveries 0.022 0.018 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.018
Racial Composition of Physician's Patients:
Black -0.029 0.027 -0.029 0.027 -0.029 0.027
Hispanic -0.021 0.021 -0.021 0.021 -0.021 0.021
Asian -0.125 0.065 * -0.124 0.065 * -0.125 0.065 *
Other Race -0.024 0.038 -0.024 0.038 -0.024 0.038
Age Composition of Physician's Patients:
Age 10-19 -0.013 0.030 -0.013 0.030 -0.013 0.030
Age 30-39 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.027
Age 40-49 0.020 0.056 0.020 0.056 0.019 0.056
Age 50-59 -0.104 0.380 -0.102 0.380 -0.101 0.377
Insurance Composition of Physician's Patients:
Medicare -0.300 0.083 *** -0.300 0.083 *** -0.299 0.083 ***
Medicaid -0.014 0.017 -0.014 0.017 -0.014 0.017
Other Government Insurance 0.094 0.098 0.094 0.098 0.094 0.098
Uninsured -0.082 0.059 -0.082 0.059 -0.082 0.059
0.294 0.120 ** 0.295 0.119 ** 0.294 0.119 **
Risk Composition of Physician's Patients:
Minimal Risk 0.012 0.189 0.012 0.189 0.012 0.189
Moderate Risk -0.193 1.978 -0.193 1.978 -0.193 1.978
Severe Risk 2.950 78.000 2.950 28.887 2.950 28.538
Hospital Size where Physician Operates:
Total Hospital Discharges (100 patients) 0.008 0.020 0.008 0.020 0.008 0.020
Hospital Bed Counts (100 beds) 0.166 0.259 0.168 0.259 0.165 0.259
Hospital Region where Physician Operates:
Region 2 -0.007 0.013 -0.007 0.013 -0.007 0.013
Region 3 -0.049 0.014 *** -0.049 0.014 *** -0.049 0.014 ***
Region 4 -0.022 0.014 -0.022 0.014 -0.022 0.014
Region 5 -0.031 0.010 *** -0.030 0.010 *** -0.031 0.010 ***
Region 6 0.010 0.015 0.010 0.015 0.010 0.015
Region 7 -0.025 0.011 ** -0.025 0.011 ** -0.025 0.011 **
Region 8 -0.006 0.009 -0.006 0.009 -0.006 0.009
Region 9 0.007 0.019 0.007 0.019 0.007 0.019
Constant 10.046 1.794 *** 0.000 *** 10.054 1.794 ***
n  2,477  2,477  2,477 
R-sq 25.60% 25.59% 25.60%
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively
Unkown Insurance
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Table 13:
Robust Fixed Effects Regression Results for Effect of
Previous Bad Outcomes on Physician Quarterly Cesarean Rate
Bad Outcome Defined as: Death, Rupture or Fistula Uterine Rupture Obstetric Fistula
Variable: Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Physician Experience:
Previous Bad Outcome -2.525 2.527 -2.633 3.214 -2.367 4.112
Patient Race:
Black 0.008 0.049 0.008 0.049 0.008 0.049
Hispanic -0.064 0.083 -0.063 0.083 -0.063 0.083
Asian -0.012 0.078 -0.011 0.078 -0.013 0.078
Other Race 0.034 0.045 0.034 0.045 0.033 0.046
Patient Age:
Age 10-19 -0.007 0.035 -0.007 0.035 -0.007 0.035
Age 30-39 -0.011 0.030 -0.011 0.030 -0.011 0.030
Age 40-49 -0.026 0.058 -0.026 0.058 -0.027 0.058
Age 50-59 1.869 0.296 *** 1.869 0.296 *** 1.868 0.296 ***
Patient Insurance Status:
Medicare -0.324 0.129 ** -0.326 0.129 ** -0.324 0.129 **
Medicaid -0.028 0.025 -0.028 0.025 -0.028 0.025
Other Government Insurance 0.201 0.117 * 0.201 0.117 * 0.201 0.117 *
Uninsured 0.034 0.075 0.034 0.075 0.035 0.075
Unknown Insurance 0.145 0.133 0.145 0.133 0.145 0.133
Patient Risk at Admission:
Minimal Risk 0.051 0.098 0.050 0.098 0.051 0.098
Moderate Risk 0.152 0.756 0.152 0.756 0.153 0.756
Severe Risk 0.170 0.066 *** 0.171 0.066 *** 0.170 0.066 ***
Constant 18.800 1.823 *** 18.809 1.823 *** 18.801 1.826 ***
n  2,477  2,477  2,477 
R-sq 1.33% 1.35% 1.36%
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: We are controlling for each individual physician in this fixed effects model.
*, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively
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Table 14:
Logistic Regression Results for Effect of Physician Quarterly Cesarean Rate
on a Patient's Probability of Having a C-Section
Variable Odds Ratio Std. Err.
Physician Practice Pattern:
Physician vuarterly “Unnecessary” Cesarean Rate  1.025  0.001 ***
Patient Complication:
Maternal Death, Uterine Rupture or Obstetric Fistula  17.135  11.100 ***
Patient Race:
Black  1.052  0.034 
Hispanic  0.905  0.042 **
Asian  0.868  0.061 **
Other Race  1.067  0.043 
Patient Insurance Status:
Medicare  0.953  0.091 
Medicaid  0.791  0.019 ***
Other Government Insurance  0.710  0.077 ***
Uninsured  0.739  0.079 ***
Unknown Insurance  1.197  0.233 
Patient Age:
Age 10-19  1.069  0.037 *
Age 30-39  0.954  0.021 **
Age 40-49  1.546  0.090 ***
Age 50-59  1.445  1.670 
Patient Risk at Admission:
Minimal Risk  2.090  0.366 ***
Moderate Risk  3.560  2.318 *
Hospital Size:
Total Hospital Discharges (100 patients)  0.999  0.001 
Hospital Bed Counts (100 beds)  1.023  0.010 **
Hospital Region:
Region 2  1.080  0.045 
Region 3  0.734  0.043 **
Region 4  0.965  0.052 *
Region 5  0.866  0.029 ***
Region 6  1.068  0.059 
Region 7  0.884  0.039 ***
Region 8  1.015  0.030 
Region 9  0.883  0.045 **
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively
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Table 15:
Bad Outcome Defined As: Patient Death
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Bad Outcomes in the Previous vuarter 0.699 0.410 * 1.373 4.135
Rate NA in the Previous vuarter 0.599 0.023 *** 0.596 0.023 ***
# Appendicitis Cases Treated -1.892 0.161 *** -1.836 0.157 ***
Black -0.016 0.035 -0.016 0.035
Hispanic -5.257 4.111 -5.081 4.116
Asian -0.188 0.088 ** -0.187 0.088 **
Other Race -0.060 0.039 -0.060 0.039
Medicare 0.047 0.028 * 0.047 0.028 *
Medicaid 0.015 0.026 0.016 0.026
Other Government Insurance -0.010 0.086 -0.011 0.086
Uninsured -0.032 0.044 -0.033 0.044
Unknown Insurance -0.222 0.137 -0.223 0.137
Female Age 0-4 0.287 0.250 0.307 0.255
Female Age 5-9 0.004 0.069 0.002 0.069
Female Age 20-29 -0.052 0.045 -0.056 0.045
Female Age 30-39 0.003 0.050 -0.001 0.050
Female Age 40-49 0.107 0.045 ** 0.105 0.045 **
Female Age 50-59 0.129 0.041 *** 0.126 0.041 ***
Female Age 60-69 0.116 0.046 ** 0.115 0.046 **
Female Age 70-79 0.148 0.055 *** 0.146 0.055 ***
Female Age 80+ 0.208 0.058 *** 0.205 0.058 ***
Male Age 0-4 0.661 0.302 ** 0.664 0.293 **
Male Age 5-9 0.131 0.057 ** 0.134 0.058 **
Male Age 10-19 -0.042 0.036 -0.043 0.036
Male Age 20-29 -0.064 0.038 * -0.067 0.038 *
Male Age 30-39 0.006 0.039 0.004 0.039
Male Age 40-49 0.122 0.040 *** 0.120 0.040 ***
Male Age 50-59 0.195 0.037 *** 0.193 0.038 ***
Male Age 60-69 0.235 0.041 *** 0.233 0.041 ***
Male Age 70-79 0.195 0.046 *** 0.193 0.046 ***
Male Age  80+ 0.175 0.060 *** 0.173 0.060 ***
Minimal Risk 0.042 0.021 ** 0.042 0.021 **
Moderate Risk 0.109 0.026 *** 0.109 0.026 ***
Severe Risk 0.103 0.039 *** 0.104 0.039 ***
Maximal Risk -0.083 0.252 -0.084 0.253
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
Robust OLS Regression Results for Effect of Bad Outcomes in the Previous Quarter on Current Quarterly 
Rate NA at the Physician Level
Patient Death, Sepsis, or 
Perforation
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Table 15(continued):
Bad Outcome Defined As: Patient Death
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Total Hospital Discharges (100 patients) 0.103 0.037 *** 0.106 0.036 ***
Hospital Beds (100 beds) -0.544 0.407 -0.574 0.406
Region 2 0.013 0.022 0.013 0.022
Region 3 0.027 0.022 0.026 0.022
Region 4 0.003 0.025 0.004 0.025
Region 5 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.017
Region 6 0.016 0.022 0.015 0.022
Region 7 0.002 0.018 0.001 0.018
Region 8 0.044 0.017 *** 0.043 0.017 **
Region 9 0.046 0.020 ** 0.045 0.020 **
Constant 3.228 2.794 3.745 2.774
n  2,454  2,454 
R-sq 76.72% 76.70%
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
Robust OLS Regression Results for Effect of Bad Outcomes in the Previous Quarter on Current Quarterly 
Rate NA at the Physician Level
Patient Death, Sepsis, or 
Perforation
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Table 15 (continued):
Bad Outcome Defined As: Sepsis Perforation
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Bad Outcomes in the Previous vuarter -2.290 2.061 0.832 0.419 **
Rate NA in the Previous vuarter 0.595 0.023 *** 0.599 0.023 ***
# Appendicitis Cases Treated -1.820 0.156 *** -1.899 0.162 ***
Black -0.016 0.035 -0.016 0.035
Hispanic -5.097 4.121 -5.311 4.110
Asian -0.187 0.088 ** -0.189 0.088 **
Other Race -0.061 0.039 -0.060 0.039
Medicare 0.047 0.028 * 0.047 0.028 *
Medicaid 0.016 0.026 0.016 0.026
Other Government Insurance -0.012 0.086 -0.010 0.086
Uninsured -0.031 0.044 -0.032 0.044
Unknown Insurance -0.224 0.137 -0.222 0.137
Female Age 0-4 0.315 0.255 0.287 0.249
Female Age 5-9 0.002 0.069 0.003 0.069
Female Age 20-29 -0.055 0.045 -0.051 0.045
Female Age 30-39 -0.001 0.050 0.004 0.050
Female Age 40-49 0.105 0.045 ** 0.107 0.045 **
Female Age 50-59 0.127 0.041 *** 0.129 0.041 ***
Female Age 60-69 0.115 0.046 ** 0.117 0.046 **
Female Age 70-79 0.147 0.055 *** 0.149 0.055 ***
Female Age 80+ 0.205 0.058 *** 0.208 0.058 ***
Male Age 0-4 0.662 0.293 ** 0.660 0.304 **
Male Age 5-9 0.133 0.058 ** 0.130 0.057 **
Male Age 10-19 -0.043 0.036 -0.042 0.036
Male Age 20-29 -0.067 0.038 * -0.063 0.038 *
Male Age 30-39 0.004 0.039 0.006 0.039
Male Age 40-49 0.120 0.040 *** 0.123 0.040 ***
Male Age 50-59 0.194 0.037 *** 0.196 0.037 ***
Male Age 60-69 0.233 0.041 *** 0.236 0.041 ***
Male Age 70-79 0.194 0.046 *** 0.196 0.046 ***
Male Age  80+ 0.172 0.060 *** 0.176 0.060 ***
Minimal Risk 0.042 0.021 ** 0.042 0.021 **
Moderate Risk 0.110 0.026 *** 0.109 0.026 ***
Severe Risk 0.106 0.039 *** 0.103 0.039 ***
Maximal Risk -0.083 0.252 -0.082 0.252
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
Robust OLS Regression Results for Effect of Bad Outcomes in the Previous Quarter on Current 
Quarterly Rate NA at the Physician Level
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Table 15 (continued):
Bad Outcome Defined As: Sepsis Perforation
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Total Hospital Discharges (100 patients) 0.106 0.036 *** 0.103 0.037 ***
Hospital Beds (100 beds) -0.580 0.405 -0.540 0.407
Region 2 0.013 0.022 0.013 0.022
Region 3 0.028 0.022 0.027 0.022
Region 4 0.003 0.025 0.003 0.025
Region 5 0.002 0.017 0.003 0.017
Region 6 0.014 0.022 0.016 0.022
Region 7 0.002 0.018 0.002 0.018
Region 8 0.042 0.017 ** 0.044 0.017 ***
Region 9 0.045 0.020 ** 0.046 0.020 **
Constant 3.807 2.764 3.163 2.791
n  2,454  2,454 
R-sq 76.71% 76.72%
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
Robust OLS Regression Results for Effect of Bad Outcomes in the Previous Quarter on Current 
Quarterly Rate NA at the Physician Level
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Table 16:
Bad Outcome Defined As: Patient Death
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Bad Outcome in Previous vuarter 0.475 0.422 3.632 1.622 **
Black -0.047 0.050 -0.047 0.050
Hispanic -0.863 4.268 -0.967 4.279
Asian -0.058 0.045 -0.057 0.045
Other Race -0.083 0.042 ** -0.082 0.042 * 
Medicare 0.006 0.030 0.006 0.030
Medicaid 0.050 0.026 * 0.051 0.026 **
Other Government Insurance 0.161 0.118 0.159 0.118
Uninsured 0.024 0.043 * 0.023 0.043
Unknown Insurance -0.160 0.079 ** -0.159 0.079 **
Female Age 0-4 0.055 0.076 0.051 0.076
Female Age 5-9 -0.053 0.060 -0.057 0.060
Female Age 20-29 -0.031 0.043 -0.034 0.043
Female Age 30-39 0.010 0.048 0.007 0.048
Female Age 40-49 0.012 0.041 0.011 0.042
Female Age 50-59 0.002 0.035 0.000 0.034
Female Age 60-69 -0.053 0.039 -0.055 0.038
Female Age 70-79 -0.063 0.055 -0.064 0.055
Female Age 80+ -0.088 0.050 * -0.089 0.050 * 
Male Age 0-4 0.306 0.222 0.307 0.220
Male Age 5-9 -0.086 0.055 -0.088 0.055
Male Age 10-19 -0.032 0.033 -0.034 0.032
Male Age 20-29 -0.052 0.038 -0.054 0.037
Male Age 30-39 -0.053 0.043 -0.055 0.042
Male Age 40-49 -0.010 0.040 -0.011 0.040
Male Age 50-59 0.041 0.038 0.040 0.038
Male Age 60-69 -0.004 0.039 -0.006 0.039
Male Age 70-79 -0.009 0.037 -0.011 0.037
Male Age  80+ -0.019 0.063 -0.020 0.062
Minimal Risk 0.065 0.023 *** 0.065 0.023 ***
Moderate Risk 0.106 0.035 *** 0.106 0.035 ***
Severe Risk 0.130 0.057 ** 0.131 0.057 **
Maximal Risk 0.020 0.050 0.022 0.050
Constant 32.879 2.580 *** 33.238 2.508 ***
n 2,491 2,491
R-sq 15.54% 17.86%
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: We are controlling for each individual physician in this fixed effects regression.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
Fixed Effect Regression with Robust Standard Errors Results for Effect of Bad Outcomes in the 
Previous Quarter on Current Quarterly Rate NA at the Physician Level, p    
Appendix
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Table 16 (continued):
Bad Outcome Defined As: Patient Sepsis
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Bad Outcome in Previous vuarter -1.840 1.402 0.586 0.444
Black -0.046 0.049 -0.047 0.050
Hispanic -1.254 0.049 -0.875 4.269
Asian -0.057 0.045 -0.059 0.045
Other Race -0.081 0.042 * -0.083 0.042 **
Medicare 0.006 0.030 0.006 0.030
Medicaid 0.051 0.026 ** 0.050 0.026 *
Other Government Insurance 0.158 0.118 0.161 0.118
Uninsured 0.024 0.043 0.024 0.043
Unknown Insurance -0.159 0.079 ** -0.161 0.079 **
Female Age 0-4 0.053 0.075 0.056 0.075
Female Age 5-9 -0.057 0.060 -0.052 0.061
Female Age 20-29 -0.031 0.043 -0.030 0.043
Female Age 30-39 0.008 0.048 0.011 0.048
Female Age 40-49 0.012 0.042 0.013 0.041
Female Age 50-59 0.002 0.034 0.002 0.035
Female Age 60-69 -0.053 0.038 -0.052 0.039
Female Age 70-79 -0.062 0.055 -0.062 0.055
Female Age 80+ -0.090 0.050 * -0.088 0.050 *
Male Age 0-4 0.299 0.220 0.305 0.222
Male Age 5-9 -0.088 0.055 -0.086 0.055
Male Age 10-19 -0.033 0.032 -0.032 0.033
Male Age 20-29 -0.053 0.037 -0.052 0.038
Male Age 30-39 -0.054 0.043 -0.053 0.043
Male Age 40-49 -0.010 0.040 -0.009 0.040
Male Age 50-59 0.041 0.038 0.042 0.038
Male Age 60-69 -0.004 0.039 -0.003 0.039
Male Age 70-79 -0.010 0.037 -0.009 0.037
Male Age  80+ -0.019 0.062 -0.018 0.062
Minimal Risk 0.065 0.023 *** 0.065 0.023 ***
Moderate Risk 0.105 0.035 *** 0.106 0.035 ***
Severe Risk 0.129 0.057 ** 0.129 0.057 **
Maximal Risk 0.014 0.053 0.020 0.051
Constant 33.273 2.532 *** 32.810 2.584 ***
n 2,491 2,491     
R-sq 18.58% 15.17%
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
Note: We are controlling for each individual physician in this fixed effects regression.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
Fixed Effect Regression with Robust Standard Errors Results for Effect of Bad Outcomes in the 
Previous Quarter on Current Quarterly Rate NA at the Physician Level
Patient Perforated or 
Ruptured Appendix
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Table 17:
Logistic Regression Results for Impact of Physician's Rate NA on 
Patients' Probability of Having a Negative Appendectomy
Variable Odds Ratio Std. Error
Physician's Quarterly Rate NA 1.056 0.001 ***
Black 1.177 0.224
Hispanic 0.534 0.160 **
Asian 0.939 0.399
Other Race 1.426 0.445
Medicare 1.153 0.181
Medicaid 1.237 0.190
Other Government Insurance 1.233 0.501
Uninsured 0.465 0.148 **
Unknown Insurance 0.981 0.778
Female Age 0-4 5.380 3.884 **
Female Age 5-9 0.644 0.357
Female Age 20-29 1.223 0.313
Female Age 30-39 1.229 0.324
Female Age 40-49 1.457 0.365
Female Age 50-59 1.503 0.372 *
Female Age 60-69 0.879 0.240
Female Age 70-79 1.328 0.425
Female Age 80+ 1.043 0.378
Male Age 0-4 24.612 12.656 ***
Male Age 5-9 0.727 0.340
Male Age 10-19 0.330 0.105 ***
Male Age 20-29 0.395 0.130 ***
Male Age 30-39 0.582 0.183 *
Male Age 40-49 0.852 0.229
Male Age 50-59 1.374 0.339
Male Age 60-69 1.659 0.433 *
Male Age 70-79 1.017 0.317
Male Age  80+ 0.546 0.207
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 17 (continued):
Logistic Regression Results for Impact of Physician's Rate NA on 
Patients' Probability of Having a Negative Appendectomy
Variable Odds Ratio Std. Error
Minimal Risk 3.011 0.383 ***
Moderate Risk 6.677 1.187 ***
Severe Risk 8.213 2.150 ***
Maximal Risk 24.979 25.340 ***
Total Hospital Discharges (100 patients) 1.008 0.004 **
Hospital Beds (100 beds) 0.938 0.038
Region 2 0.753 0.156
Region 3 0.809 0.200
Region 4 0.898 0.229
Region 5 0.945 0.140
Region 6 1.129 0.241
Region 7 0.640 0.114 **
Region 8 0.949 0.136
Region 9 1.009 0.186
n 10,385
Source: Pennsylvania Inpatient Hospital Admissions Data,  PHC4, 2009
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
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